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FOREWORD
The United States has a core national interest in
maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East as
well as containing or eliminating threats emanating from
that region. Yet, if most American strategic analysts can
agree on this assumption and these goals, there is often
disagreement on the ways to best achieve them. In this
monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill presents his analysis
of how the United States and other Western states might
best address their military cooperation and basing needs
within the Middle East, while still respecting and working
with an understanding of regional and especially Arab
history and concerns. He also provides the reader with
policy recommendations based upon his analysis.
This monograph is not intended to be an exhaustive
examination of all U.S. basing activities or military
cooperation in the Middle East. It also does not include
a discussion of Israel, which would be a separate
and important study in and of itself. Rather, it is an
examination of other Middle Eastern (and especially
Arab) views about Western military facilities in their
region and foreign soldiers on their soil. Dr. Terrill traces
the historical background of Western bases in the Middle
East, noting how these facilities often were used by the
Western powers to dominate local client states. Such
policies of domination were especially conspicuous in
the 1940s due to British (and later American) efforts to
confront the Nazi menace in that part of the world. These
policies, however necessary at the time, were greeted
with a predictable backlash in the 1950s by populist Arab
nationalists. The U.S. and British military presence in the
region declined dramatically in the decades that followed,
but the Western military involvement once again became
prominent and noticeable in the 1990s, following changes
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in regional security arrangements inspired by Saddam
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.
New versions of old concerns about Western forces
became prominent in contemporary times, and yet the
idea of a Western withdrawal from the region is also of
serious concern to a number of Arab leaders. Currently,
the United States seeks to help defend its many allies in
the region without doing so in a way that inadvertently
encourages radicalism in the area or adds to the
discomfort level of our regional supporters and allies. Dr.
Terrill clearly believes that this can be done, but that such
tasks must be approached with delicacy and a reasonable
sensitivity to local concerns. States that appear to be
treated like client governments inevitably will have to
prove to their population and the world that they are not
de-facto colonies.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
monograph as a contribution to the national security
discourse on this important subject, as our nation continues
to grapple with a variety of problems associated with the
U.S. presence in the Middle East. This analysis should be
especially useful to U.S. military strategic leaders as they
seek to address the complicated interplay of issues related
to Middle Eastern security in what our local allies would
see as a politically acceptable and constructive manner.
A more general reading audience also might be struck by
the number of solid allies that the United States has in the
region and the continuing need to work effectively with
these nations and to treat them with the respect that allies
clearly deserve.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The Arab World has maintained a long and
problematic history with Western military bases on
its territory. Until at least the 1940s, imperial powers
often maintained that these bases were designed to
defend regional nations against foreign invaders, but
they also were used to pressure and sometimes control
client governments. However necessary and important
such pressure might have been during World War II,
it was still a series of infringements on sovereignty
that formed an important backdrop for Arab views
on U.S. basing issues. Nationalist ferment against
foreign bases was a key component of Arab politics
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In response to these
regional political concerns, as well as changing Western
military requirements and economic pressures, the
U.S. and British military presence in the Middle East
declined steadily, and a number of major Western
bases were evacuated. By the early 1970s, the U.S. and
British military presence in the area had been scaled
down dramatically, and other issues had become more
prominent in Arab-American relations.
The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait introduced a
major shock into the Arab system, and Saudi Arabia
allowed large numbers of U.S. and other troops to
be stationed on its soil as a prelude to the liberation
of Kuwait in 1991. Significant numbers of U.S. forces
remained in Saudi Arabia for another 12 years
following Saddam’s 1991 defeat by coalition forces,
establishing a new military reality in the region.
Additionally, Bahrain and Oman strengthened existing
agreements with the United States in the aftermath of
Operation DESERT STORM, while Kuwait, the United
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Arab Emirates, and Qatar negotiated new security
agreements. Nevertheless, in the years following 1991,
many of the old concerns about the political meaning of
a Western military presence in the region re-emerged.
Saudi Arabia, in particular, began to repeat the earlier
pattern whereby large and important Arab states often
find it embarrassing to rely too publicly on the West
for their military security. Additionally, these same
states may have difficulty presenting themselves as
important voices within the Arab World if they appear
to be disproportionately influenced by the West and
dependent on it for national security concerns. The
United States and Saudi Arabia eventually reached
an agreement for the withdrawal of almost all U.S.
military forces in 2003, although the two countries
remain close, and the United States continues to be a
major arms supplier to the Saudis.
A variety of large or strategically placed Arab
states, including Egypt and Jordan, maintain close
military relations with the United States, although
for nationalistic reasons they stop short of allowing
permanent bases. The strong exception to the general
Arab disapproval of U.S. bases in the Middle East
has remained the more welcoming approach of the
smaller Arab Gulf states. Some of these nations at
times deliberately have sought to attract a U.S. military
presence which they viewed as vital to their defense.
It is, therefore, useful to continue to nurture current
basing arrangements with friendly Arab countries of the
Gulf which accept a U.S. presence as vital to their own
national security and perhaps their national survival.
Such states include Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the United
Arab Emirates, and under certain circumstances,
Oman. These countries have proven their friendship
and their willingness to work with the United States
under a variety of circumstances.
viii

It is also important for the United States to continue
to maintain strong military links to other significant
Arab allies that do not involve permanent bases or
even placement of military stocks for future use.
Strong military ties with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
and others are valuable for the security of the region,
and can be especially important during times of crisis
when these nations can help the United States through
their political influence, intelligence sharing, and
temporary use of their military facilities. The support
of these countries also may be necessary to ensure that
other states permitting U.S. basing are not criticized
mercilessly or humiliated in front of their publics and
the world.
It should be emphasized further that the United
States must not place serious hope in the prospect
of long-term military bases in Iraq unless there is
overwhelming political sentiment within that country
favoring these bases. The development of such
sentiment appears extremely unlikely. Iraq has a
sensitivity about Western domination that is grounded
firmly in its historical experience, and this is a history
which contemporary Iraqis have not forgotten.
Moreover, Iraq is a large and prominent Arab state
which seeks a major voice in regional politics. An
ongoing U.S. military presence in Iraq could serve to
undermine the credibility of the Iraqis in asserting that
voice. Any Iraqi government seeking permanent bases
would almost certainly hurt itself with its own public.
Finally, despite the strong and important relations
that the United States has with a variety of Gulf Arab
allies providing basing rights, it would be a mistake
to treat these relationships too casually. A constant
temptation for a superpower is to assert its own
concerns at the expense of its allies, and justify such
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actions by the disparity in power. Unfortunately,
allies that depend on the United States for their own
security can become especially resentful of U.S. actions
because their frustration and that of their publics are
compounded by that dependency. These frustrations
can create problems later that could have been avoided,
and every effort must be made to do so. A number of
states within the region respond exceptionally well to
high level consultation and simply a willingness to
listen to their points of view. Many within the Gulf
also appreciated the U.S. administration’s willingness
to stand up for the value of the United Arab Emirates
alliance during the Dubai Ports World controversy.
All of these states understand the dangers posed by
Iran, although they must sometimes go through the
motions of showing respect for the Iranian presence in
the region. None of these states trust Iran, and while
the U.S. approach to regional security may sometimes
be a source of aggravation, it is viewed widely as an
indispensable presence.



REGIONAL FEARS OF WESTERN PRIMACY
AND THE FUTURE OF U.S. MIDDLE EASTERN
BASING POLICY
The British and Americans had failed in all their efforts to
persuade Egypt to join some sort of military partnership.
Whether described as “mutual defence” or “regional
defence,” it had always come down to the same thing—
committing Egypt (and other Arab countries if they
followed the Egyptian example) to an unequal alliance
which would certainly perpetuate the stationing of
foreign troops on Egyptian soil and very likely to involve
Egypt in a war with [America’s enemies].
Mohamed Heikal, 19871
Iran reacted strongly in 2004 when the eighth edition of
the National Geographic atlas was released with the term
Arabian Gulf in parenthesis beside the more commonly
used Persian Gulf. Tehran banned that edition of the
atlas, as well as National Geographic journalists, until the
map for the Gulf region was changed.
Kuwait Times, May 4, 20062
I cannot defend Qatar if a big power attacks. We need
the U.S. here in Qatar, and the U.S. needs us.
Qatari Foreign Minister
Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassem al-Thani, 20023

INTRODUCTION
In August 1945, the United States emerged from
World War II as a global superpower with a military
presence throughout key strategic areas of the world.
Additionally, as a result of this war and the later Cold
War, Washington enjoyed a massive global military


presence characterized by large numbers of formal
and informal alliances as well as a U.S. presence at
numerous bases throughout the world.4 Some of these
bases were developed for long-term use with a huge
infrastructure and thousands of troops stationed there.
Moreover, the United States emerged from World War
II in an occasionally tense but usually close alliance
with the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent France,
the two major colonial powers in the Middle East and
North Africa.
In the years 1945-91, the dominant U.S. considerations in seeking, establishing, and maintaining
overseas basing rights and facilities centered on
containing the military and political power of the Soviet
Union and the People’s Republic of China. A related
concern was to guarantee long-term U.S. and Western
access to key economic resources and most especially
petroleum and other energy resources.5 The demise of
the Soviet Union in December 1991, as well as ongoing
U.S. progress in improving relations with both Russia
and China, has led to a re-evaluation of the strategic
logic of U.S. basing strategy in various parts of the
world, including Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. In
the aftermath of these events, a variety of policymakers
and strategic thinkers began to conclude that changes
in the international political system have helped to
undercut key strategic rationales for those overseas
bases formerly used within the context of Cold War
strategy.6 This shift has created a situation whereby
both the United States and the nations providing
basing rights to U.S. forces are seeking a new common
understanding on a variety of basing issues, including
the threats these facilities are meant to oppose and
the conditions under which such forces will be used
to support military operations against hostile forces.



Under these new conditions, the United States has
announced that as many as 70,000 additional troops
will be withdrawn from Europe and Asia.7 Large standing armies in areas of potential Cold War confrontation will be replaced by “expeditionary” forces which
will be sent to areas of crisis when this is determined
to be necessary. To support the expeditionary forces,
smaller bases sometimes described as “lily pads” are
considered useful.8
The United States remains a superpower with
worldwide interests despite global political changes
and the movement to reconfigure its military presence
abroad. This status is reflected in strong U.S. security
concerns in the Middle East and U.S. interest in
supporting a number of important allies in the region.
These partnerships are closely linked to the emergence
and evolution of post-Cold War security issues and
threats to the welfare of the regions in question. In the
Middle East, and especially the Gulf region, strong U.S.
security ties to regional states are influenced heavily
by ongoing problems with Iran, the rise of terrorism,
and the danger of regionwide instability and political
unrest. There is also uncertainty over ways in which
post-Saddam Iraq’s political future might have security
repercussions for neighboring states. Consequently, a
U.S. presence elsewhere in the region will be important
in addressing these problems, even in the aftermath of
an eventual withdrawal from Iraq. It is, therefore, vital
that the United States continues to maintain a presence
in the region despite the receding threat from Russia
and the as of yet unrealized dangers from any other
extra-regional power.
Unfortunately, even in cases of overlapping
Western and local interests, basing agreements
often can be sensitive issues in the Middle East, and



especially in the Arab World, due to long-standing
concerns about potential Western domination of the
region. While many Middle Eastern nations need and
desire U.S. military support and sometimes even a U.S.
presence in their country, there is often a price that
Arab governments must pay with their own publics
once they provide such facilities to Western nations.
To understand some of the sensitivities that exist about
U.S. bases in the Middle East, it is important to examine
the recent history of the region and the attitudes that
have been influenced by past Arab experience with
Western forces stationed on their territory. Moreover,
the combination of an evolving strategic situation,
historical sensitivities, and new regional concerns
about U.S. willingness to exercise military power have
all led to a situation whereby the United States must
be especially thoughtful in considering how and under
what conditions to deploy its forces in this region. In
order to protect itself and its allies, the United States will
need a basing and military presence policy based on a
firm understanding of regional politics and historical
sensitivities.
WESTERN BASES IN THE ARAB WORLD
FROM WORLD WAR II UNTIL OPERATION
DESERT STORM
Although the United States clearly did not emerge
as a global superpower until after World War II, the
war itself was a particularly important era for relations
between the Arab World and the West. While many
of the Arab states were not formal colonies, they
often were controlled through a variety of political
devices, including widespread foreign political
manipulation and intimidation of local governments.



Treaties between the imperial power and the client
states were usually imposed by the outside power and
designed to ensure continued Western influence over
the local Arab states.9 The presence of Western forces
in a variety of Arab countries helped to ensure that
unequal power relationships were enforced strongly.
At the conflict’s initiation in September 1939, many
Arab states were nominally independent but still
very much dominated by colonial powers. As the war
continued, some Arab leaders impressed by German
victories became interested in pressing the limits of
their own sovereignty with the more powerful Western
states, particularly the United Kingdom. At one point
in early 1941, German and Italian forces advanced to
within 60 miles of Alexandria, Egypt, casting doubt
on British longevity in the region.10 At least some Arab
leaders doubted that it was in their interests to join the
United Kingdom in its seemingly inevitable defeat,
while others viewed intra-European conflicts as an
opportunity for their countries to break free of some of
the constraints of foreign control.
World War II was also a time when the British, in
particular, were focused heavily on their own national
survival and had little patience with Arab sensitivities
over sovereignty issues. Hence, any Arab nationalist
actions or agitation that were deemed to threaten British
war aims were suppressed quickly and harshly to the
extent that it was in the United Kingdom’s power to do
so. Additionally, many British leaders, and particularly
Prime Minister Winston Churchill, remained interested
in maintaining a strong and vibrant British Empire well
into the post-war era. Correspondingly, the United
Kingdom appeared to be offering very little to its Arab
allies, protectorates, and colonies in the post-War era
beyond a return to the pre-war status quo.11 Moreover,



although the United Kingdom imported most of its
oil from the United States during the war, both British
and American officials understood the importance
of Middle Eastern oil, and both increasingly were
interested in assuring their own post-war access to this
resource.12
In this environment, real and imagined Western
intrigue often was viewed as dominating local politics.
Iraq, on the eve of World War II, was an important
example of a society whose citizens, often correctly,
saw a British hand in all major domestic events.
Sometimes, however, this concern was extended into
unsubstantiated theories such as those surrounding
the death of Ghazi Ibn Fiesal, the young second king
of Iraq. Ghazi had made radio broadcasts from 1937
until his death in 1939 denouncing French rule in
Syria, British-supported Zionist activities in Palestine,
and British influence in the Gulf. According to British
sources, King Ghazi later died on April 4, 1939, as the
result of a high-speed automobile accident that centered
on the use of alcohol.13 Nevertheless, Arab nationalists
throughout the country suspected or believed that he
was murdered because of his willingness to oppose
British interests.14 Regardless of whether he was
murdered or not, Ghazi’s death may have been a
welcome development for the British, and tended to
feed the belief that the British were prepared to do
whatever they deemed necessary to keep their puppet
leaders in line. The belief that Ghazi was murdered
persists among some Arab authors into contemporary
times.15
Later, in a much less equivocal move, the antiBritish, but also nationalist, Iraqi Prime Minister
Rashid ‘Ali al Kaylani was ousted by British
military intervention in April 1941 after a prolonged



constitutional crisis.16 While not a soldier himself,
Rashid ‘Ali had been reinstalled in power through a
pro-German coup in collaboration with nationalist
army officers. The group he represented previously
had explored the possibility of obtaining German aid
to fight the British. London therefore was provoked
deeply by nationalist agitation, threats to its nationals,
actions against pro-British Iraqis, and Baghdad’s
newfound interest in support from Nazi Germany.
The British correspondingly chose to address the issue
through military intervention. Some of the forces used
to defeat Rashid ‘Ali and his supporters were airlifted
to the British-controlled air base at Habbaniyah, Iraq,
while others came from Jordan (then Tranjordan),
including units from the tough and capable Britishled Arab Legion.17 Iraq remained under occupation
until 1945, and London reinstated a pro-British Iraqi
leadership prior to the departure of British and Empire
troops from Iraq at that time. Thus, in the April 1941
countercoup, the Habbaniyah Air Base was not used
to protect Iraq from a foreign enemy but rather to help
enable a foreign power to occupy Iraq. Under these
circumstances, nationalist resentment was inevitable
regardless of how justified British actions may have
been in struggling against the Nazi menace.
Elsewhere in the Gulf area, Reza Shah of Iran was
dethroned by the British military in August 1941 and
deported to South Africa, where he died 3 years later
in 1944. Reza Shah had been impressed enormously
with European fascism, and was openly friendly to
Nazi Germany, thereby sealing his fate so far as the
British were concerned. He was succeeded by his 21year-old son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who was to be
Iran’s last shah.18 The son was viewed by the British as
a weak and insecure youth who would be intimidated
by the example of his father’s dethronement. Like


Rashid Ali, the old shah was seen as being too open
to German overtures. While Iran is not an Arab
country, this display of raw power against a large and
nominally independent state nevertheless was viewed
with considerable apprehension throughout the Arab
World and the wider region.
Another well-known and important example of
British primacy over a large and important Middle
Eastern state involves Anglo-Egyptian relations.
Again, wartime strategy dominated the British strategic outlook as they desperately defended Egypt’s
Suez Canal from advancing German and Italian
forces. At various points in time, the British position
in Egypt appeared on the verge of collapsing, and
the British were briskly and harshly unsympathetic
to any efforts to assert the prerogatives of Egypt’s
formal independence. On February 4, 1942, British
Ambassador to Egypt Sir Miles Lampson (later Lord
Killearn) ordered Egyptian King Farouk to dismiss
his pro-Axis Prime Minister and appoint an official
supportive of British goals.19 Lampson made his
demands while the king’s palace was surrounded by
British military units, including armored vehicles. The
king was given the stark choice of submitting to British
demands or being arrested. Farouk, having no dignified
alternative, chose the former in a major humiliation for
both the king and Egypt.20 At least one senior Egyptian
officer offered his resignation to the king because of
the army’s failure to defend him, but Farouk declined
this offer.21 He understood that there was little that the
Egyptian military could do because of the powerful
British military presence within Egypt.
Following the end of World War II, the Western
presence in the Middle East appeared less heavyhanded but was still significant and included Western



forces being stationed at regional military bases. The
United States also increasingly was interested in
military facilities within the Arab World. Earlier, in
1943, Saudi King Abdul Aziz granted U.S. rights to
build an air base in Dhahran in eastern Saudi Arabia.
In the aftermath of the war, this facility expanded to
become an important Strategic Air Command (SAC)
asset. Additionally, the U.S. Navy visited the Saudi
port of Damman in 1948 and began using port facilities
in Bahrain in 1949.22
The other major U.S. air base in the Arab World
during this time frame was Wheelus Air Base in
Libya, a country which became independent under
a conservative monarchy in December 1951. Libya
concluded a treaty of friendship and alliance with the
United Kingdom in 1953, while in 1954 the Libyans
agreed to provide the United States with basing
rights in exchange for economic aid. Wheelus, near
Tripoli, became the centerpiece of this effort and was
considered a strategically valuable Cold War base. The
facility eventually became one of the largest SAC bases
outside of the continental United States. Additionally,
the Libyans set aside ranges in the desert to be used by
U.S. aircraft on practice bombing runs. These bombing
ranges were particularly valuable since Libya’s
uncluttered airspace, clear weather, and large areas of
uninhabited land greatly facilitated training missions.23
USAF units practiced tactics for both nuclear and nonnuclear attacks at Wheelus.
The Cold War, which began under President Harry
Truman, reached a new intensity during President
Dwight Eisenhower’s administration (1953-60). In this
increasingly vitriolic conflict, U.S. Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles asserted that neutralism was immoral in the fight against international communism



and that any decent state would follow the U.S. lead
in its efforts to fight this menace.24 This outlook is
seen to echo in contemporary American arguments
on international terrorism that “you are either with us
or against us.”25 Nevertheless, even during the Cold
War, such arguments often were received poorly by
various Arab publics more concerned about ending the
vestiges of colonialism rather than becoming part of an
international confrontation between the United States
and the communist powers. Many Arabs believed that
Arab and Western interests diverged significantly on
issues involving Israel, oil, arms sales to the region, and
foreign relations, among other concerns. If Arab states
remained under Western domination, then, according
to this logic, Arab interests would be ignored in favor
of often conflicting Western interests. Additionally,
the 1950s often were seen as something of a heyday for
an interventionist Central Intelligence Agency, with
an August 1953 intervention to restore Iranian Shah
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to power as a centerpiece of
this effort.26 Iran’s proximity to the Arab World made
this intervention a vivid example to a number of Arab
states. A more overt demonstration of U.S. power
came in 1958 when U.S. Marines invaded Lebanon and
became briefly involved in internal Lebanese politics
under the Eisenhower Doctrine.27 This doctrine stated
the United States had the right to intervene in any
country threatened by international communism. The
suggestion that Lebanon was threatened in such a way
was, nevertheless, a significant stretch.28
The 1950s also saw the rise of strong Arab nationalist
leaders, the most important of whom was President
Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt (1918-70). Until Nasser,
many, if not most, Arabs remained uncertain that one
of their own leaders could challenge the West openly
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on important issues and remain in power. Yet, Nasser
confronted the West on a variety of levels, gaining
enormous popularity in the process. He emerged as
an early advocate of neutralism or nonalignment and
became one of the towering figures associated with
that movement.29 A central component of that ideology
was to deny the former colonial powers basing
rights in nonaligned countries under all but the most
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, the Egyptian
president moved rapidly to implement his approach
by negotiating an October 1954 agreement for the
evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal zone,
where such forces had been stationed since 1882.30
President Nasser’s daughter, Dr. Huda Abdel Nasser,
later stated that her father was “opposed to alliances
between strong and weak countries because they
inevitably led to the strong country taking advantage
of the situation and imposing its own agenda on the
weak country.”31
President Nasser’s version of Arab neutrality
had tangible implications for U.S. strategy in the
Middle East. In one particularly notable dispute, the
Egyptians emerged as the central Arab opponent to
the U.S.-supported 1955 military alliance popularly
known as the Baghdad Pact (and later referred to as
the Central Treaty Organization [CENTO]). Cairo’s
“Voice of the Arabs” radio described the U.S.-favored
Western alliance as colonialism in disguise and harshly
denounced the regional countries that were willing
to join the Baghdad Pact.32 This alliance included the
United Kingdom, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, with
the United States as an “associate member.”33 Despite its
limited status with the organization, the United States
viewed the alliance as a useful vehicle for containing
communism, while Arab nationalists often considered
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it to be a way of helping to secure Western domination
of the Middle East.34 Jordan’s King Hussein actually
signed the Baghdad Pact as a way of securing additional
Anglo-American military aid, but the December 1955
anti-Pact rioting was so severe in that country that
efforts to actually work within the organization had
to be postponed indefinitely.35 Partially out of fear of
Egypt, Saudi Arabia also refused to consider joining
the Baghdad Pact and falsely denied the existence of
U.S. military facilities in Dhahran (which was now one
of the largest air bases in the world).36 These reactions
suggested that Cairo had now proven that it had the
ability to thwart at least some Western priorities for
regional basing rights.37
President Nasser’s most important test and the
event that helped catapult him to the position of a panArab hero was the 1956 Arab-Israeli war, known in
Egypt as the “Tripartite Aggression.” British and French
leaders, in collusion with Israel, undertook military
intervention against Egypt to overthrow President
Nasser, after he announced the nationalization of the
Suez Canal.38 The Eisenhower administration chose
to oppose the Anglo-French-Israeli effort, which then
floundered partially as a result of the lack of U.S.
political and especially economic support, as well
as strong domestic opposition within the United
Kingdom.39 Nasser was able to remain in power as an
Arab nationalist leader who had successfully defied
both Israel and two former colonial powers. The 1956
Suez War often is seen as a key point at which the United
States displaced the old colonial powers of Britain and
France as the major external power influencing the
region.
A second important benchmark for the decline of
British power in the region is the destruction of the
pro-British Hashemite monarchy of Iraq in a 1958
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military coup and its replacement by a series of often
radical Arab nationalist governments. In addition to its
problems with the Baghdad Pact, the Iraqi monarchy
was viewed widely as corrupt, and its destruction
evoked little sorrow from the Iraqi masses at the time. It
also was viewed often as harshly repressive, although
that government’s authoritarian practices were only
the most pale shadow of those to be undertaken by
the totalitarian regimes to emerge later in Baghdad.
Underscoring the monarchy’s lack of legitimacy, no
Iraqi army units rose to its defense as it faced military
overthrow.40 After the 1958 military coup, the British
were evicted peacefully from the Habbaniyah Air Base
and its associated strategic radar installations.41 Iraq
also immediately stopped sending representatives
to Baghdad Pact meetings and formally withdrew
from the treaty in 1959. This removal of the British
military presence from Iraq, 17 years after the Rashid
‘Ali coup, had enormous nationalist significance and
was deeply popular in Iraq. Huge crowds filled the
streets, shouting enthusiastic slogans supporting the
revolution, condemning the old regime, and displaying
anti-British emotions that have been described by two
leading Iraq scholars as “almost uncontrollable.”42
For a brief time, the Iraqi coup leader and later head
of state, Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim, emerged as a
political rival to Nasser for Arab leadership.43
Western military bases in the Arab World
continued to be an important issue throughout the
1960s and the 1970s, although such concerns often
were displaced by the larger issue of U.S. differences
with the Arab World over U.S. support for Israel. Such
concerns also were mitigated by the ongoing process
of Western withdrawal from regional bases in the
face of nationalist opposition and other concerns. The
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Saudis continued to show exceptional sensitivity over
the U.S. Air Force use of the Dhahran Air Base and
made it clear that they did not wish to renew the lease
when it came up in 1962. The President John Kennedy
administration correspondingly evacuated U.S. forces
from the facility at that time.44 This change was not a
major problem for U.S.-Saudi relations since the United
States increasingly was interested in intercontinental
ballistic missiles and bombers, rather than regional air
bases, serving as the backbone of SAC. Dhahran’s value
as a SAC base had been declining correspondingly for
years. The Saudi unease over Dhahran throughout this
period nevertheless was an important indicator of the
sensitivity of the issue of U.S. military forces on Arab
soil.
In an interesting blend of the basing issue and the
Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. forces felt compelled to give
Libyan officials a comprehensive tour of the Wheelus
Air Base in June 1967 to reassure the Arab World
that this facility was not being used by U.S. forces
for combat missions against Egypt and in support of
Israel during the Six-Day War.45 President Nasser had
claimed that U.S. and British forces were flying such
missions as part of the overall war effort on the Israeli
side. The claim, which was later retracted, was made
in the hope of justifying the unfolding Arab defeat and
gaining stronger Soviet assistance for the Egyptians.
This linkage of Western basing with problems with
Israel seems to have illustrated the depth of ongoing
suspicions that such facilities might not always be
utilized to support Arab interests.
Later, in September 1969, the United States evacuated Wheelus Air Base after a then young Muhammar
Qadhafi took power by ousting the elderly pro-Western
King Idris. This evacuation was a key demand of the
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new Libyan nationalist regime, which had taken its
inspiration from President Nasser.46 This demand was
facilitated by the expiration of the U.S.-Libyan basing
agreement in 1970, and the unwillingness of the new
regime to even discuss the possibility of extending it.
The last U.S. military forces left Wheelus on June 11,
1970, a date that was later celebrated in Libya as a
national holiday.47 Egypt naturally approved of the
Libyan decision, but the Egyptians, nevertheless, had
to make an exception to their own concerns about
neutrality by improving their military ties with the
Soviet Union in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli
War in order to prepare for renewed military conflict
with Israel. In December 1969, the Soviets controlled
six Egyptian airfields and had up to 20,000 military
personnel in Egypt.48 Later, as a result of serious political
difficulties and a desire for diplomatic flexibility,
Soviet personnel were expelled by Nasser’s successor,
President Anwar Sadat, in the summer of 1972.49
The British also were engaged in a process of
withdrawal from many of their Middle Eastern
bases in the time frame between 1967 and 1971. The
decision to withdraw British forces was based heavily
on financial considerations and by the strategic
implications of Indian independence in 1949. While
Gulf oil remained an important consideration for the
British, its protection did not seem to require a large
ongoing British military commitment. Additionally,
the United Kingdom expected to continue business
ties with the newly independent governments of the
Gulf in such states as Bahrain, Qatar, and the United
Arab Emirates. All of these states became independent
in 1971. Another state that became independent as a
result of the British military withdrawal from areas east
of Suez was the People’s Republic of South Yemen. In
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1967 British troops withdrew from this former colony
and protectorate and gave up the large and important
British naval base at Aden.50
The 1978-79 Iranian revolution eliminated an
important U.S. non-Arab ally that provided key
intelligence facilities to the United States.51 The ouster
of the shah also replaced a friendly monarch with an
angry Islamic regime whose leaders bore a special
grudge with the United States due to previous U.S.
support of the Iranian monarchy. This unfortunate
development was complicated further by the initial
Iranian interest in exporting its revolution to other
states in the region.52 Moreover, the Iranians tended to
ridicule U.S. allies in the region as unfit for leadership
and supporting what they contemptuously described
as “American Islam.” In response to a variety of world
events, including the fall of the Iranian monarchy
and especially the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
President Jimmy Carter enunciated the “Carter
Doctrine” in 1979.53 In presenting this doctrine to the
public, President Carter stated, “An attempt by any
outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region
will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of
the United States of America, and such an assault will
be repelled by any means necessary, including military
force.”54 When President Carter made these statements,
the United States was importing approximately 43
percent of its annual requirement for oil, and the U.S.
military presence in the Persian Gulf was centered on a
limited number of ships and naval personnel stationed
in Bahrain.55
Surprisingly, the Carter doctrine did not lead to a
sweeping expansion of U.S. forces in the Gulf region,
despite the President’s decision to place it under U.S.
military protection. Instead, Carter sought to help
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defend the area in nonintrusive ways with the formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
(RDJTF) which was to become U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) in 1983.56 American diplomats also
negotiated new access agreements to facilities in Kenya,
Somalia, and the British-controlled island of Diego
Garcia in the Indian Ocean.57 The only Gulf country
from which they obtained a new access agreement
was Oman.58 Even by the late 1980s, the U.S. military
presence in the Middle East clearly was limited.
A handful of U.S. naval warships were stationed
at Bahrain, with occasional port visits conducted
elsewhere in the region.
The large and important Bright Star exercises, hosted by Egypt, also began in 1981, and have continued to
serve as a cornerstone of U.S. regional security policy.59
Elsewhere, military protection for Saudi Arabia was
expected to involve primarily “over the horizon” (OTH)
support due to the Kingdom’s special sensitivity about
Western troops and bases on its soil.60 Also in the Gulf,
Oman maintained discreet intelligence and security
relations with the United States and United Kingdom
partially due to fears about revolutionary Iran.61 Most
of the other Gulf militaries were small and linked
to the British. The Jordanian military also provided
support and training to a variety of Gulf states.62
Kuwait in the late 1980s was overtly neutralist, deeply
pro-Palestinian, and had no interest in hosting U.S.
or other foreign forces on local bases.63 The Kuwaitis
instead chose to negotiate a defense agreement that
depended on British military assistance sent to them
from elsewhere in the region should they be attacked.
The British defense agreement with Kuwait expired in
May 1971, leaving that country with no foreign bases
on its soil and no formal external protector.64 Kuwaitis
eventually would pay a horrendous price for failing
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to address this situation when Saddam Hussein seized
the country in 1990, claiming the independent existence
of that country was a vestige of imperialism.
THE IMPACT OF OPERATION DESERT STORM,
THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE
CONTAINMENT OF IRAQ
The August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait fundamentally changed the military relationship between
the United States and the Arab World, and led to new
types of cooperation between the United States and
a variety of Saddam’s Arab neighbors. According to
journalist Bob Woodward, the Saudis were shown
U.S. satellite imagery in the aftermath of the Kuwait
invasion, indicating that Iraqi forces appeared to have
been deployed for a possible military assault against
the oil-rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.65 While
Saddam’s willingness to follow one reckless action
with another is uncertain, the Saudis may, nevertheless, have been deeply concerned about the danger of
an Iraqi-dominated Gulf region.66 They also had a keen
sense of their own vulnerability. The Saudi capital of
Riyadh is only 275 miles from the Kuwaiti border, and
this distance could have been traversed in 3 days by
properly supported mechanized and armored forces.
Furthermore, the only ground force between Saddam
and the Saudi oil fields of the Eastern Province was a
battalion of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG)
which was comprised of only around 750 troops.67
Although this force would have been supported by the
modern and well-equipped Royal Saudi Arabian Air
Force, they had no chance of stopping a determined
Iraqi attack without foreign military support. These
concerns led to the Saudi decision to reverse previous
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policies and allow U.S. and other anti-Saddam coalition
forces to be stationed in Saudi Arabia. 68
The political problems associated with the
deployment of Western forces in Saudi Arabia were
eased by the participation of a number of Arab states
in the U.S.-led anti-Iraqi coalition. Two of these states,
Egypt and Syria, even sent substantial numbers of
troops to participate in Operations DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM, although both countries played
only limited roles in the subsequent liberation of
Kuwait.69 Other Arab states publicly offered their
military and logistical facilities to support coalition
operations. Sultan Qabus of Oman stated that “Friends
will not stand with hands tied behind them,” indicating
that the United States and its partners were welcome
to use Omani facilities to resist Saddam in this time of
crisis.70 Support for U.S. actions, nevertheless, were not
universal in the Arab World. Jordan did not participate
in the anti-Iraq coalition, and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization under Yassir Arafat eventually chose to
support Saddam politically after ineffective efforts
to find an “Arab solution” to the crisis.71 Libya’s
Muhammar Qadhafi, who has maintained a history
of poor relations with the Saudis, also opposed the
deployment of U.S. troops in the region and made
angry speeches criticizing the Saudi Arabian king for
permitting the American military to use his territory,
despite the Iraqi threat to that country.72 Saddam
responded to this Arab division by seeking to portray
himself as an Arab nationalist leader under siege from
the West and Western stooges, but he clearly was
having only limited success in getting his message
across.73
The United States and its allies administered an
overwhelming defeat to Iraq in early 1991, which was
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so devastating that many within the U.S. administration
expected it to lead to the fall of the Saddam Hussein
regime. According to a variety of sources, including
former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and
former Defense Secretary (later Vice President) Richard
Cheney, the U.S. administration expected that the
humiliation of such a massive defeat in a short period
of time probably would lead to a military coup against
Saddam.74 Moreover, any potential coup plotters
were given strong indications that almost any Iraqi
government resulting from such action reasonably
could request much more liberal surrender terms
than would have ever have been given to Saddam
Hussein.75 Such terms could include Iraqi requests for
the lifting of United Nations (UN) sanctions and relief
or forgiveness from reparations to be paid to Kuwait.
Iraqi coup leaders taking power from Saddam could,
in most cases, credibly claim that they had no power
to dissuade Saddam from invading Kuwait, and
that therefore there was no justification for sanctions
against a post-war Iraq without Saddam. With the idea
of a coup in mind, President George H. W. Bush called
upon the Iraqi population to overthrow the dictator.
Unexpectedly, instead of a military coup, Iraq
experienced anti-regime popular uprisings originating
in the Kurdish and Shi’ite areas. Furthermore, to the
surprise of many American observers, the Saddam
regime managed to survive the crisis presented by these
attacks and by the humiliation of its massive defeat.
In part, this development occurred because Saddam
still managed to draw enough support from Iraq’s
Sunni Arab community to keep the government and
the military functioning despite the serious uprisings
in the northern and southern parts of the country. In
particular, the Sunni-dominated military held together
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with no defections of company-sized units or larger to
the rebels.76 In the face of hostile Kurdish and Shi’ite
Arab uprisings, Iraq’s Sunni Arabs may have feared
a national reckoning that would extend far beyond
Saddam and his immediate circle. The decision by many
Sunni Arabs to support Saddam rather than align with
Shi’ites and Kurds seeking to overthrow or undermine
his regime may have been an interesting harbinger of
future Iraqi sectarian problems. Many Sunnis clearly
were indicating in 1991 that they would rather live
under Saddam than risk the possible consequences of
a Shi’ite-dominated government.
Saddam’s ability to remain in power for 12 more
years after the 1991 war, while a tragedy for the Iraqi
people, did have an unexpected side benefit for the
United States. After the war, Saddam’s government
was viewed internationally as a criminal regime that
needed to be the subject of continued international
scrutiny for its military and especially weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)-related activities. Intrusive UNsponsored inspections for WMD programs continued
for years in an effort to find and eliminate every last
vestige of Saddam’s nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons programs. Such inspection efforts continued
until 1998 when Saddam ordered UN inspectors to
leave his country. This order was followed by Operation
DESERT FOX, a 4-day U.S. and British bombing
campaign against Iraq’s remaining WMD suspect sites.
While conflicting accounts of the effectiveness of the
Operation DESERT FOX raids existed at the time they
were conducted, it is now clear that Western and UN
policies followed by the air strikes effectively ended
the Iraqi WMD program.77 If an Iraqi coup had taken
place in 1991 as planned, it is doubtful that a postSaddam military government would have faced the
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same rigorous international scrutiny should it had
elected to move forward on these programs.
The survival of the Saddam Hussein regime also
had other implications that were more complex. The
basing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia continued after
1991 as a result of the remaining Iraqi threat and the
U.S. presence there became a significant and ongoing
source of friction between the United States and Saudi
Arabia in the years following Operation DESERT
STORM. Some of the concerns related specifically
to a Western presence in the country of Islam’s two
most holy mosques. The Saudi government also was
criticized by some of its own citizens for being unable
to provide for its own security after decades of massive
arms purchases from the West.78 What had initially
appeared as a short-term U.S. presence to deal with
a specific threat now evolved into an increasingly
controversial open-ended decision to retain at least
some U.S. troops indefinitely. Kuwait, on the other
hand, welcomed an ongoing U.S. military presence
following the war, and the other small Gulf states of
Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates moved
to establish their own close military relations with the
United States shortly thereafter. These small states
were under no illusions about their own vulnerability
and, unlike Saudi Arabia, felt no embarrassment about
their interest in Western military protection.
Additionally, the Saudi government often was
viewed throughout the region as closely associated with
U.S. policy in Iraq since a no-fly zone over the southern
portion of the country was maintained from Saudi
and Kuwaiti air bases.79 The UN sanctions imposed
on Iraq eventually were to become deeply unpopular
throughout the Arab World, and sanctions and nofly zones often appeared to the Arab public as two
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sides of the same coin.80 This problem was aggravated
sometimes by various U.S. policy statements on
sanctions, which many Arabs viewed as excessive and
vindictive. When, in May 1996, for example, Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright was asked if the human
toll of the sanctions was an acceptable price to pay for
containing Saddam, she answered, “I think this is a
very hard choice. But the price--we think the price is
worth it.”81 This remark was viewed widely as disregarding the suffering of innocent Iraqis.82
While the Iraqi threat brought the United States
and Saudi Arabia together in 1990-91, another unifying
external threat, the Soviet Union, crumbled during that
same time frame. This potential adversary had been
viewed as a mortal danger by the both countries and
correspondingly generated U.S.-Saudi cooperation
throughout the Cold War years. At least some Saudis,
including King Feisal (d. 1975), believed in a bizarre
theory of Zionist-Communist cooperation and thereby
managed to merge what they viewed as a Soviet and
an Israeli threat.83 Additionally, Saudi Arabia was
involved deeply in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan
and cooperated closely with Western security services in
coordinating anti-Soviet activities.84 Anti-communism
was an important motivation for cooperation between
Saudi Arabia and the United States and helped each
country set aside some of their differences. The collapse
of the Soviet Union meant that the common threats
binding the United States and Saudi Arabia had faded
to a crippled Iraq and an Iran with severely limited
power projection capabilities for conventional warfare
across the Gulf.
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THE AFTERMATH OF THE
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACKS
The September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks
against U.S. targets served as another major turning
point for the ways in which the United States conducted
its foreign policy, especially in the Middle East. In the
aftermath of the attacks, the United States emerged as an
aroused and angry superpower responding to vicious
and unprovoked strikes against its civilian population.
American anger over 9/11 was viewed widely as
justified or at least comprehensible throughout the
world. Moreover, remarks by President Bush indicating
that countries worldwide had to choose between the
United States and the terrorists underscored the depth
of the American anger. Under these circumstances, a
variety of Arab and Muslim nations felt that they had
to be especially attentive to U.S. requests for basing
rights and other concessions since they did not wish
to be viewed by the United States as insufficiently
concerned about terrorism.
As the United States prepared to respond to the
9/11 strikes, it moved to reinvigorate its relationships
with a number of allies and establish new military
relations with a variety of other nations in strategic
locations. The government of Pakistan which had
helped to establish the Taliban regime in Afghanistan
now abandoned its Afghan ally and moved rapidly
to side with the United States as it prepared for its
upcoming war in Afghanistan. Pakistani military
facilities including air bases correspondingly were
made available for U.S. use.85 Moreover, the United
States also obtained basing rights in the former Soviet
republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
The U.S. Secretary of Defense called the Central Asian
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facilities “operating bases,” rather than permanent
bases, since they were to be used to deal with a
specific enemy who the U.S. leadership felt could be
destroyed quickly. These bases included the large and
important Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan,
where the United States remained until receiving a
shutdown order from the Uzbek government in July
2005, following a severe souring of relations with the
United States.86 In Kyrgyzstan, the United States also
negotiated an agreement for the use of Ganci Air Base in
late 2001.87 This facility was co-located with Manas Air
Field on the outskirts of the capital, Bishkek. Ganci Air
Base remains in use by U.S. forces supporting ongoing
operations in Afghanistan.88 Kyrgyzstan later sought to
raise the rent on this base dramatically, but then backed
away from provoking a bilateral breech with the United
States.89 Throughout the Afghan war, U.S. forces have
used Tajikistan bases only for emergency landings and
occasional refueling.90 After the war, the United States
established bases in Afghanistan itself. The Afghans
appear to have mixed feelings about permanent use
of these facilities. President Karzai has stated that he
favors a long-term “strategic relationship” with the
United States and seems open to a permanent military
presence in that country.91 Public opinion, however,
seems uncertain on the issue, with key media outlets
expressing reservations on the idea. Occasional antiAmerican riots also underscore the potentially volatile
nature of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan.92
Problems with the U.S. military presence in Saudi
Arabia also became more troublesome during this
time frame. Former Central Command Commander
General Tommy Franks in his 2004 book, An American
Soldier, described the relationship between the United
States and Saudi Arabia as highly charged and stated
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that “cultural friction remained a way of life” despite
the fact that most U.S. military personnel in Saudi
Arabia have been stationed in remote areas such as
Prince Sultan Air Base in the desert south of Riyadh.
General Franks contrasted U.S. military difficulties
with the Saudis with the smooth military relations that
he noted between the U.S. military and the smaller
Arabian Gulf states “whose friendship with the United
States was based on mutual respect.”93 Nevertheless,
Saudi Arabia was willing to support the U.S. military
operations in Afghanistan while seeking to conceal
that it was doing so. During the 2001-02 Afghanistan
War, the Saudis provided operational facilities for U.S.
Special Operations forces at Arar, refueling facilities,
cheap fuel, and overflight rights.94
THE 2003 INVASION OF IRAQ AND THE
UNCERTAINTIES OF POST-SADDAM IRAQ
Planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq led to several
problems related to U.S. bases in the Middle East. Both
Saudi Arabia and Turkey had major facilities which
Pentagon planners hoped, and perhaps expected, to be
made available to help implement U.S. plans for regime
change in Iraq. Additionally, Kuwait was viewed as a
vital staging point for U.S. and coalition ground forces
planning to attack northward. Qatar and the United
Arab Emirates, as well as various Central Asian bases,
also were important to support a variety of air missions
against Iraq.
Turkey was key to the creation of a northern
front which could be used to confuse Saddam about
the direction of the main invasion effort, as well as
safeguard northern Iraqi oil fields. The U.S. plan was
to have ground forces from the 4th Infantry Division
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strike from Turkish territory while supported by
significant airpower from Turkish air bases, including
the important air base at Incirlik, approximately 250
miles southeast of Ankara. Nevertheless, the prospect
of a U.S.-led war against Iraq in early 2003 was deeply
unpopular with the Turkish public. Many Turkish
parliamentarians regarded the plan to attack Iraq as
unjustified, and the Turkish Parliament narrowly
refused approval of Pentagon requests to allow the
4th Infantry Division to enter Iraq from Turkey. The
Turks did, however, grant U.S. Air Force jets the
right to refuel in their country on their way to Iraq.95
The Turkish example is interesting because U.S.
policymakers strongly believed that they eventually
would be able to strike a deal with the Turks for the
use of their facilities in the planned ground invasion of
Iraq.96 That they ultimately were unable to do so was a
source of considerable frustration to many within the
U.S. leadership. The incident reveals the danger that
even the closest of friends may choose to withhold
support in some situations, and no country should be
taken for granted. One author also suggests that the
Turks should never have been presented with such a
sensitive request, since the possibility of a mechanized
division and its attendant supply units being emplaced
in Turkey and then readied to attack Iraq is something
that could not be done in a low profile manner that
respected Turkish public opinion.97
On the eve of the 2003 war, there was a substantial
U.S. Air Force presence in Saudi Arabia, and the United
States was clearly interested in using Saudi facilities
in the upcoming conflict. U.S.-Saudi disagreements
about the wisdom of invading Iraq were, however,
serious and based on a fundamental clash of visions
for the Middle East. While U.S. leadership viewed
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Saddam Hussein as an ongoing danger, many Saudis
considered him much more of a spent force that had
lost most of his capacity to threaten them.98 Moreover,
Riyadh was never fully comfortable with the concept of
regime change in Iraq. Saddam, as a politically isolated
Sunni strongman, was far from the worst possible
outcome for the Saudis. If U.S. plans for a new Iraq
failed, Riyadh faced the possibility of a militant Shi’ite
regime on their northern border, or even an Iraqi civil
war with dangerous spillover potential.99 Perhaps even
more threatening was the prospect of an American
success in Iraq that placed a democratic government
in Baghdad. Such a government would serve as a
rival seeking influence in Washington and perhaps
even cause Saudi citizens to view their monarchy
as less attractive than the democratic alternative.
Nevertheless, Western press sources maintain that the
Saudis eventually allowed the United States to use
Prince Sultan Air Base and at least two other facilities
in the war with Iraq.100 The Saudis also are reported
to have made the Combined Aerospace Operations
Center (CAOC) at Prince Sultan Air Base available for
U.S. use in supporting the war.101
In March 2003, U.S.-led forces attacked Iraq with
the intention of overthrowing the regime of Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein and replacing it with a new and
democratic system. As expected, Iraq’s conventional
military forces were defeated rapidly by overwhelming
U.S. firepower. The United States, however, was not
able to implement plans for a rapid withdrawal of the
majority of its forces once Saddam had been ousted.
Instead, civil disorder and an emerging insurgency
necessitated a continuing large-scale U.S. presence
in that country. This presence was resented widely
throughout the Arab World and harshly criticized in the
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Arab press in the immediate aftermath of the invasion.
In this environment, it has become a cliché to suggest
that virtually all Arab states passionately opposed the
invasion of Iraq, but could not manage to dissuade
the United States from undertaking this operation.
Such statements are, nevertheless, overgeneralizations
since some Arab states quietly supported the U.S.
decision to invade Iraq, as will be documented later
in this monograph. During the period of the Iran-Iraq
War, Saddam often was seen throughout the region
as a strong Arab nationalist and a defender of Arab
interests, and his support of the Palestinians also was
widely viewed as positive. Since his defeat in 1991,
however, Saddam had lost a great deal of his previous
luster as an Arab nationalist leader.102
The overwhelming hostility of the Arab masses to
U.S. intervention in Iraq, despite the hatred of many of
these same people for Saddam Hussein, is puzzling for
many Americans.103 Yet, many Arabs believe that there
are rational and indeed compelling reasons for Arab
enemies of Saddam Hussein to regret the invasion of
Iraq. The 2003 Iraq war initially was viewed by some
in the Arab World as the beginning of a new approach
to foreign policy involving U.S. preemptive strikes
carried forward without broad international backing.
The Iraq war was the first example of the new doctrine
sometimes referred to as a “strategy of preemption.”
This strategy was seen as being applicable to more than
a single regime, and there was widespread uncertainty
about whether the United States was planning
additional wars after the Iraq intervention. Elites and
media professionals throughout the Arab World also
expressed uncertainty that the United States would be
satisfied with simply defeating the Saddam Hussein
regime or was instead motivated by a larger agenda,
especially when prominent neoconservatives, outside
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of government, spoke of additional candidates for
“regime change” and such things as “the establishment
of some kind of American protectorate over the oil
fields of Saudi Arabia.”104 As time went on, however,
these Arab concerns at least were assuaged partially
by a belief that problems in Iraq have undercut the
appeal of military intervention as a response to other
problems with various regimes in the region.
In addition to concerns about the future of
U.S. policy, regional states also must address the
implications of U.S.-initiated changes that already
have occurred. However controversial or subject to
differing Western and regional analysis, the ouster of
the Saddam Hussein regime fundamentally altered
the nature of Gulf security requirements. The residual
dangers posed by Iraqi conventional military forces to
their neighbors now had evaporated for the indefinite
future. The United States would no longer be required
to rush troops to Kuwait in response to Iraq saberrattling such as had occurred in October 1994 when
Saddam had moved a two-division force toward the
Kuwaiti border with the apparent aim of undermining
the sanctions regime which had been directed at
Iraq.105 While this effort was unsuccessful in achieving
Saddam’s goals, it did illustrate that Saddam could
still cause at least a limited amount of trouble, and
his continued presence in power could cause periodic
problems. Even so, in the aftermath of Saddam’s
removal from power, new dangers were quick to
emerge as Iraq faced the problems of insurgency,
terrorism, and escalating sectarian violence and ethnic
strife. All of these problems can have potential spillover
effects for neighboring states.
Adding to these problems, the citizens of postSaddam Iraq were quick to show many of the
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sensitivities about Western domination that had
characterized earlier Iraqi history. According to long
time Iraq-based journalist Anthony Shadid, the rhetoric
of a democratic Middle East, guided by a benevolent
United States, often is “reminiscent of century-old
colonialism to a Third World audience.”106 No foreign
power ever entered the Arab World by claiming that
it had come to exploit it. All colonial powers have a
rich fabric of rhetoric suggesting that they are there to
support the hopes and aspirations of the indigenous
people. Some Western leaders such as British General
Sir Stanley Maude, who led an expeditionary force
into what is now Iraq in 1917, have used the term
“liberation,” and contemporary Iraqis remain deeply
familiar with their own history on these issues.107
Moreover, anti-American political agitation sometimes
has boosted the domestic approval ratings of radical
Iraqi leaders such as Shi’ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Sadr
experienced a brief but notable rise in his popularity
among Iraqis as a direct result of clashes between his
forces and the U.S. military in 2004.108 These concerns
about the United States appear to have declined later
in the occupation when sectarianism threatened to
grow to unmanageable proportions. With thousands of
people dying each month in sectarian violence, many
Iraqis were much more willing to support any forces
of order.109 Additionally, some Sunnis appeared to be
hedging their bets by supporting the insurgents while
seeking a continued U.S. presence in Iraq.
The wider Arab World also evinced considerable
displeasure over the U.S. presence in Iraq in the
immediate aftermath of the invasion. The two major
issues identified in a series of public opinion polls
as dividing the United States and the Arab World
are Israel/Palestine and the Iraq War. It is doubtful
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that large numbers of people within the Arab World
have rejected the American point of view on Iraq
because it has not been explained to them enough
times or provided to them in a suitably packaged
presentation. In a June 2005 Pew Global Attitudes
survey, it became apparent that even popular policies
like tsunami relief did little to reverse the magnitude
of anti-Americanism.110 Anti-American sentiment also
tends to spike as a result of certain events such as the
U.S./Iraq attacks on insurgents based in Fallujah or as
a result of Israeli crackdowns on Palestinians, which
often are assumed to be orchestrated with the approval
of the United States. Yet, by 2006, many commentators
within the region reluctantly had reversed themselves
and maintained that a precipitous U.S. withdrawal
would remove the most important obstacle to an Iraqi
civil war.
ONGOING TENSIONS ASSOCIATED
WITH THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
While differences over Israel/Palestine and Iraq
dominated U.S.-Arab relations, other problems
occasionally surfaced to aggravate the already strained
set of relationships, thereby complicating U.S.-Arab
military relations. Some of these concerns centered on
U.S. actions outside of Iraq that have been associated
with the Global War on Terrorism. The U.S. prison at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, most notably, has been of
concern to a number of Arab countries and publics.
A major problem here has been the recurring one of
lurid and inflammatory overseas headlines emerging
from questions surrounding U.S. administration of
the Guantanamo Bay-based prison facilities. These
questions about U.S. activities often tend to overshadow
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the terrorist backgrounds of many of the inmates as they
are reported by the world media. Additionally, some
of the attorneys for various detainees grant interviews
in which they relay prisoner charges of U.S. military
misconduct and abuse. The shocking and repellant
photos associated with the Abu Ghraib scandal in Iraq
have created an atmosphere in which many of these
charges are taken uncritically at face value.
Additionally, a recurring stream of damaging
stories has emerged from the prison, much of it based
on unsubstantiated information. The rumors of Koran
desecration, reprinted by the U.S. magazine Newsweek,
are especially inflammatory for pious Muslims. Such
assertions added to a general belief that the United
States did not respect Muslim values, and the Global
War on Terrorism was actually a war on Islam.
Moreover, Newsweek’s decision to retract the story
often was viewed, if erroneously, as the result of U.S.
Government pressure on the publication rather than
an accurate admission that the story was untrue.111
Another problem involves various ex-prisoners
from Guantanamo who are now returning to their home
countries with frightening claims of how they were
treated while in custody.112 Virtually all ex-prisoners
giving interviews strongly maintain that they are
innocent of any terrorist or extremist ties. These claims
frequently are treated sympathetically by the Arab
media as well as in many European media outlets.113
Moreover, extensive criticism of the Guantanamo
facility by European political and human rights figures
also has been noticed by the global and Arab media
and publics.114 European criticism is viewed widely as
less biased than that emerging from the Middle East.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, for example, called
upon the United States to close Guantanamo prison,
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although U.S. leadership responded that the prison
“serves a purpose and is there for a reason.”115 The
human rights organization, Amnesty International,
also has called upon the United States to close
Guantanamo Bay.116 Other reports of detainee abuse
often find their way into the Western and Arab press,
and nongovernmental organizations such as Human
Rights Watch also have criticized the United States for
its policies toward Muslim and Arab prisoners.117 Of
considerably less interest to the international media is
that some of the prisoners released from Guantanamo
have returned to terrorist activities in Arab countries
following their repatriation.118
An additional ongoing problem involves questions
as to whether the U.S. image may be hurt by various
high profile problems between Europe and the
Arab World despite strong, continuing, public U.S.European differences over Middle East policy. Under
this logic, the United States, as the perceived leader
of the Western world, sometimes is tarnished by
the actions of other Western states. Severe Muslim
rioting in France in late 2005 was a reminder of some
of the difficulty in integrating French society.119 The
Danish cartoon controversy was even more serious.
Moreover, many in Europe wish to keep Turkey out of
the European Union because it is large, economically
unequal to Europe, and, most especially, Muslim. All
of these problems can merge into an overall view of the
West as intolerant and unfriendly toward Muslims.
Muslim and Arab anger about the invasion and
occupation of Iraq also seems to have made it more
difficult for U.S. officials to get a fair hearing for
American policies in the war on terror, and at least
some attempts to find common ground with Muslim
reformers have been treated as efforts to change
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the subject from Iraq.120 Conversely, U.S. and Iraqi
leaders sometimes have scolded regional leaders for
distancing themselves from post-Saddam Iraq rather
than taking a deeper interest in supporting efforts to
make the Iraqi government a success. Iraqi leaders
also have expressed disappointment that most Arab
states have not sent ambassadors or even in some cases
lower ranking diplomats to Iraq. President Talibani
has called this “an insulting issue for the country,” but
a variety of Arab states respond that Arab diplomats
are not safe in Baghdad.121 This position is extremely
credible since a variety of Arab diplomats in Baghdad
have been kidnapped, assassinated, or wounded in
attacks by terrorists. The Jordanian Embassy itself
was bombed in August 2003, with 19 dead and 65
wounded, although all remaining embassies in Iraq
now appear much better protected and are thus more
hardened targets against any future terrorist attacks.122
The Iranians, who are striving consistently to enhance
their influence in Iraq, appointed an ambassador to
that country in May 2006.123
No major polls of Arab and Muslim publics suggest
that the United States is unpopular primarily because
of its culture as often is claimed. Rather, most polls
suggest that U.S. policies, particularly toward the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iraq, are unpopular.
Anecdotal evidence, nevertheless, does exist that
many Arabs are worried about the excesses of Western
culture and the omnipresence of this culture through
globalization. Describing conditions in their country
prior to the 1979 revolution, Iranians referred to these
troubles as “Westoxification.” In response to concerns
about Western cultural penetration, President Bush has
stated that, “Some people in Muslim cultures identify
democracy with the worst of Western popular culture
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and want no part of it. And I assure them, when I speak
about the blessings of liberty, coarse videos and crass
commercialism are not what I have in mind.”124 Other
Western countries with even more liberal social policies
are nevertheless popular with the Arab World, and
claims that the United States is disliked for its policies
(as well as its overwhelming power to implement them)
appear credible. France and Germany both are viewed
positively over foreign policy issues, although this
may change with France due to the occasional spikes
in high profile problems that Paris seems to have with
its Muslim population.125
POST-SADDAM BASING POLICIES IN IRAQ
AND THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM SAUDI
ARABIA
One of the most immediate results of the 2003 Iraq
war has been the evacuation of almost all U.S. military
forces from Saudi Arabia. The decision to withdraw
U.S. combat forces was announced in April 2003
with the apparent hope of obtaining an immediate
foreign policy benefit from Saddam’s ouster.126 As
a result of this policy, the United States removed
around 200 military aircraft from Prince Sultan Air
Base, along with their supporting troops. Less than
500 U.S. military personnel remained in the Kingdom
with most of these associated with military training
missions for the Saudi armed forces.127 This move
came after a long series of military policy problems
taking place between the U.S. armed forces and their
Saudi hosts, including a Saudi interest in diversifying
their weapons purchases away from the United States
and concerns that Saudi Arabia was being asked to
fund too many of the costs associated with the U.S.
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presence. These defense specific concerns aggravated
the more political problems involving disagreements
over issues of Iraq, Afghanistan, and terrorism.128 The
removal of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia also was seen
as depriving Osama Bin Laden and other radicals of
a critical issue upon which to base their propaganda
campaign against the House of Saud. On the eve of
the invasion, Saudi Arabia was hosting around 5,000
mostly Air Force U.S. military personnel operating
primarily from the Prince Sultan Air Base.129 The Saudi
Arabian government may have felt considerable relief
at the departure of these U.S. forces from their country,
although this did not prevent the outbreak of antiregime violence.130 Additionally, a new joint U.S.-Saudi
interest emerged in May 2003 when terrorists from al
Qa’ida of the Arabian Peninsula began attacking U.S.
and Saudi government targets within the country.
Al-Qaeda claimed in making such attacks, they were
“attack[ing] the rear of the American Army.”131 This is
a somewhat unusual claim since major elements of the
U.S. Army were not in Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. Air
Force was leaving. The attacks continued sporadically
throughout 2003 and 2004, but the worst of them
appeared to be over by the beginning of 2005, at which
time the government was clearly on the offensive
against the militants.132
It is possible that the Saudis would have sought a
U.S. withdrawal from their country even in the absence
of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.133 Over the years, Riyadh
became increasingly disinterested in large-scale,
routine, and conspicuous military cooperation with
the United States while being reassured with regional
developments that seemed to opt well for Saudi
national security. In particular, Riyadh managed to
improve its relationship with Iran, while believing that
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Saddam’s Iraq no longer constituted a grave offensive
threat. The Saudis also objected to U.S. “pinprick
raids” on Iraq, which they viewed as creating support
for Saddam without doing anything to undermine
his rule.134 Nevertheless, there was an ironic side
to the 2003 withdrawal of U.S. forces from Saudi
Arabia. While the Saudi leadership was concerned
with hostile propaganda resulting from a large U.S.
military presence in their country, they also became
apprehensive when the United States developed a
special military relationship with Qatar, including a
massive U.S. military presence in that country.135 While
the Saudi relationship with the United States is based
fundamentally on oil and not bases, Riyadh may have
worried that its influence in Washington was being
diluted by U.S.-Qatari military ties. In the aftermath of
the U.S. military withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, the
smaller Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states were
therefore to become especially important as part of U.S.
regional strategy and thus more able to resist Saudi
advice and pressure. The Saudis, for their part, continue to purchase large amounts of U.S. and other
Western arms and emphasize the continuing importance
of a U.S.-Saudi dialogue on strategic issues.
The departure of U.S. military forces from Saudi
Arabia has raised questions about the possibility of
a future U.S. military presence at bases within Iraq
for reasons beyond those of crushing the current
insurgency and empowering a viable and survivable
Iraqi government.136 These proposals, which seem
to originate with neoconservative writers, appear
misplaced, given Iraq’s long history of concern about
Western domination and the possibility that a friendly
Iraqi government could harm its own legitimacy
by allowing U.S. bases to remain in that country for
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other than the specific need to quell current disorders.
Moreover, this study already has suggested that large
and important Arab countries, including but not
confined to Iraq, consistently have displayed unease
with Western bases. Western bases hurt the credibility
of states seeking Arab leadership or even an important
voice within regional politics by making those states
appear too responsive to foreign priorities.
Key U.S. policymakers understand the delicacy of
this situation. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
in answer to a question at a press conference, stated
that it was “inaccurate and unfortunate” to suggest
that the United States was seeking permanent bases in
Iraq.137 Other senior officials such as U.S. Ambassador
Zalmay Khalilzad continue to insist that the United
States does not wish to obtain permanent bases.138
As valuable as these statements are, current U.S.
officials may not be the individuals who are most
likely to make a final decision on whether or not to
seek permanent bases, since the insurgency and civil
unrest are likely to continue until at least the end of
the current administration. It is hoped that the next
administration will reiterate such statements upon
taking office if the United States continues to have
troops in Iraq at that time and should the possibility of
permanent bases appear sufficiently unresolved as to
require clarification.
Additionally, the vast majority of Iraqi leaders
have indicated that they do not support U.S. basing in
their country beyond the time frame needed to quell
the insurgency.139 Many Iraqi leaders call for a rapid
withdrawal of U.S. forces, but do not give more than
a vague time frame (if that), as a way of playing to
public opinion without compromising their country’s
national security.140 A few Iraqis, such as radical leader
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Muqtada al Sadr of the Sadr II Movement and Harith
al Dari of the Association of Muslim Scholars, have
indicated that they favor an immediate withdrawal
of all U.S. forces.141 Virtually no serious U.S. policy
experts or political leaders currently suggest that the
United States should remain in Iraq if asked to leave
by an elected government. Such a request seems to
be a strong possibility should U.S. hopes for a selfconfident Iraq to emerge from the current difficulties
be realized.
Despite these problems, basing arrangements are
necessary for those troops currently deployed in Iraq.
Consequently, construction of acceptable facilities is
continuing on the assumption that these bases will
be of service so long as the United States remains in
Iraq and can be turned over to Iraqi forces upon the
U.S. departure. Currently, four of the most important
basing locations in Iraq are Talil in the southern part
of the country, Bilad Air Base (or Camp Anaconda) in
central Iraq, al Asad airbase in Western Anbar province,
and al Qayyarah in northern Iraq. All of these bases
are some distance from major population centers and
have vast infrastructures, and sometimes are referred
to colloquially as “superbases.”142
The new large superbases being built by the
United States currently have functions that are directly
related to the suppression of the insurgency, and
under some scenarios may remain in Iraq after the
bulk of U.S. combat troops have departed to provide
logistical support for the Iraqi military in assuming
responsibility for fighting the insurgency.143 Another
scenario described by author Fred Kaplan involves the
possibility that U.S. troops would remain locked down
in these bases should full scale civil war break out in
Iraq. This policy, according to Kaplan, would give
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the United States “diplomatic leverage” and help to
discourage foreign intervention by Iraq’s neighbors.144
Unfortunately, no basing scheme provides total
security for its personnel, and wide-ranging terrorist
activities could be expected to claim a number of
Americans lives under such circumstances. Such a
scenario correspondingly would require a remarkable
level of patience and understanding from the American
public, since the idea of leaving troops in Iraq during a
large-scale civil war may seem utterly appalling even
if they are locked-down in large bases that limit the
number of casualties.
U.S. MILITARY RELATIONS WITH EGYPT
AND JORDAN
Egypt.
Two of the most important U.S. Arab allies, Egypt
and Jordan, do not host U.S. permanent bases but are,
nevertheless, important defense partners. Ideally,
these nations will continue their highly-supportive role
as U.S. partners, and it is possible that either of these
states could serve as a model for a stable and friendly
post-Saddam Iraq should such an entity emerge from
the current struggle.
Cairo has continued to show sensitivity about any
Western military presence on Egyptian soil except
under crisis conditions or for joint training exercises. In
1981, for example, negotiations were conducted to allow
U.S. use of the Egyptian port of Ras Banas if an Arab
state were threatened.145 Ultimately, these negotiations
failed because the Egyptians viewed the United States
as demanding too large a role in managing the facility,
which was regarded as a matter of extreme sensitivity.
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Nevertheless, around the same time, the United States
and Egypt began their collaboration on regional security through the large and important “Bright Star”
military exercises. These exercises were first conducted
in the early 1980s and have continued to be held
periodically (usually once every 2 years) ever since. In
addition to the United States and Egypt, the exercises
often involve contingents from other Arab and European
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries.
Around 70,000 troops from 11 nations participated in
Bright Star 2001, while Bright Star 2003 was cancelled
due to troop requirements for the Iraq war.146 Around
30,000 troops from 12 countries participated in Bright
Star 2005.147 The U.S. and international contributions
to this exercise were more limited than usual due to
continuing commitments in Iraq and elsewhere.
The U.S.-Egyptian security relationship probably
reached its height in 1991 when Egyptian troops
formed a highly visible part of the anti-Saddam
coalition to liberate Kuwait. This relationship has
remained steady through a series of significant political
disagreements. Egypt publicly opposed the U.S.-led
invasion of Afghanistan and especially the war in Iraq,
but allowed the United States to use the Suez Canal
and Egyptian airspace to support operations in these
theaters. In addition, Cairo also accepted that cruise
missiles would be fired from the Red Sea.148 Egypt also
has been reported to have been involved in intelligence
cooperation and other forms of cooperation with
the United States to support the struggle against
international terrorism.149 This close relationship with
the United States over terrorism often is reinforced by
Egyptian concerns about its own radical Islamists.
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Jordan.
Jordan is also an important Arab ally of the United
States, although it does not allow the United States to
maintain permanent bases on its soil. Amman does,
however, participate in a variety of joint exercises with
the United States, and extensive military cooperation
exists between the two countries. Like Egypt, Jordan
publicly opposed the war in Iraq, but it has chosen to
work with the United States despite the disagreement.
To this end, Jordan even allowed a limited and temporary U.S. military presence on its soil in 2003 for participation in the war itself. This presence has been confirmed
by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer in his memoirs, My
Year in Iraq. In describing the relationship, Bremer
stated that Jordan “had helped us considerably during
the invasion, allowing Coalition Special Operations
forces to operate from its territory,” although he does
not mention numbers.150 In Cobra II, by Michael Gordon
and retired U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General
Bernard Trainor, the authors state that the United
States and Jordan engaged in lengthy negotiations
over the size and type of U.S. force to be stationed in
Jordan to support the hostilities. Gordon and Trainor
suggest the eventual agreed-upon troop strength was
5,000 U.S. soldiers, down from a U.S. request to put
14,000 troops in the kingdom.151 During the war, the
presence of a large number of combat soldiers in the
kingdom remained a closely guarded secret, although
the Jordanian government did admit that U.S. troops
had been stationed in Jordan for potential searchand-rescue missions from its airfields and to install
Patriot anti-missile systems.152 Nevertheless, Jordanian
complicity with the United States was widely suspected
at the time, and this collaboration may have been one of
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the reasons terrorists bombed the Jordanian Embassy
in Iraq in 2003.
Following Saddam’s ouster, Jordan undertook an
ambitious U.S.-supported program to train selected
Iraqi officers, soldiers, and policemen.153 Bremer
called this effort “the world’s largest police training
program.154 While the program was valuable in
providing training and instilling professionalism, this
effort was not enough to reform and re-build the Iraqi
police in the short term. The election of highly sectarian
leaders in Iraq complicated police professionalization,
since various internal security figures sought to bring
their favored militiamen into the interior ministry.
Militiamen associated with the most important
Shi’ite political parties consequently were favored for
admission into the Interior Ministry police forces in
a number of instances.155 Efforts at reform may have
rolled back this practice to some extent, although
the ultimate value of the Jordanian training program
remains uncertain. If the program does fail, it will
apparently do so because of the divisive nature of Iraqi
politics rather than for any shortcomings attributable
to the Jordanians.
THE POST-SADDAM THREAT ENVIRONMENT
AND THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
As noted earlier, a number of the smaller Gulf Arab
states established formal bilateral security relations
with the United States in the aftermath of the 1991
Iraq War. These relationships were treated publicly as
a supplement to the GCC defense framework, but in
practice they were developed in the certain knowledge
that the GCC could not deter aggression on its own.
Before examining those bilateral ties, it is worth
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considering the nature of the GCC itself, including its
problems with collective defense. The GCC was formed
in May 1981 in the aftermath of the emergence of the
Islamic Republic of Iran (1979) and the outbreak of the
Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). The organization’s purpose
was to help coordinate the foreign, defense, and internal
security policies of the member states. The states that
comprise the GCC are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Each of these states maintains a similar type of political
system, and all have a general interest in containing
revolutionary ideologies, terrorists, and hostile states
that may threaten their futures.
Despite common concerns, serious military
cooperation among the GCC states has remained an
elusive goal, and there is little likelihood that the GCC
will act in a united way in any future crisis. Kuwait’s
GCC membership was not even the shadow of a
deterrent against an Iraqi invasion of that country in
1990, and the other GCC states were unable to help
Kuwait without massive reliance on U.S. and other
military intervention. Nor does it appear that the GCC’s
military capabilities have improved dramatically since
that time. In a recent authoritative study, GCC military
cooperation was described as largely a “hollow shell.”156
The same study stated that the GCC collective defense
program is characterized by token forces and exercises,
along with numerous meetings, speeches, reports, and
other paperwork that has led to almost no meaningful
progress.157 The vast majority of serious decisions about
Gulf security issues continue to be made at a unilateral
(or bilateral) rather than a multilateral level. Former
CENTCOM Commander General Anthony Zinni has
stated bilateral cooperation with the United States often
was less difficult for these countries than multilateral
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cooperation with each other.158 Consequently, the
difficulties that the Gulf Arab states have in cooperating
with each other on any meaningful military level helps
to ensure that each of these states will continue to need
support from outside powers and will be particularly
interested in maintaining strong relations with the
United States. Furthermore, even a united GCC would
be an unequal match for an assertive Iran or a hostile
and mobilized Iraq, should such an entity emerge from
the current effort to define and develop a post-Saddam
political system.
Yet, strong Gulf Arab ties with the United States also
may obfuscate the fact that these links remain subject
to disruption, downgrading, and serious domestic
criticism within the Gulf countries. According to one
informed observer, Gulf Arabs have the potential to
become more anti-American than any other Arab group
because of their strong dependence on the West.159 A
dependency relationship with a country which they
may see as a demanding and often unfair benefactor
can be a serious problem for smooth relations between
the United States and the GCC states. According to
General Zinni, these problems also can be aggravated
by “the usual American know it all arrogance that
tells [the Gulf Arabs] what they ought to be doing.”160
Moreover, it would be a mistake to conclude that the
Gulf Arabs will tolerate public disrespect indefinitely
because of their present dependence. While the current
leaderships of the Gulf Arab states are willing to work
with the United States to overcome bilateral problems,
significant portions of the populations of these countries may become more open to anti-American polemics
and propaganda if the United States visibly treats their
countries in disrespectful ways (as occurred during to
Dubai Ports World controversy, to be discussed later).
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The Gulf Arab states also have some extremely
serious security concerns including a militant
Iran, an uncertain future for Iraq, and a variety of
other problems. These states thus maintain normal
diplomatic and economic relations with Iran, while
often worrying about Tehran’s intentions. Current
Iranian president Mahmoud Amadinajad, in addition
to being a hardliner on the United States and Israel, is
known to be an extreme nationalist, who is at home
with the idea that Iran should dominate the Gulf.161 The
Gulf Arab states also are significantly more concerned
about Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions than most
other Arab countries, and Gulf Arabs are far less likely
to dismiss the issue by expressing countervailing
concerns about the Israeli nuclear program.162 The
destruction of the Saddam Hussein regime and the
uncertainty of its successor suggest that the Gulf states
can no longer depend on strategic balance between
Baghdad and Tehran. Additionally, the 1991 invasion
of Kuwait suggests that a policy of trying to balance
these two states needs to break down only once in a
while to have catastrophic results.
The tension between Iran and the GCC states
sometimes bubbles to the surface, and some Iranian
officials still seem to hold a grudge for Gulf Arab support to Saddam during the Iran-Iraq war. Ali Larijani,
the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security
Council (SNSC), for example, has stated, “When have
we ever attacked a neighbouring country in the last
150 years? We were the ones attacked by Saddam and
then [the Gulf Arab states] backed him.”163 As harsh
as this comment appears, it is true that most Gulf
Arab states, and especially Kuwait, strongly backed
Saddam Hussein in the war with Iran.164 Kuwait, to the
leadership’s later regret, was an exceptionally strong
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financial and diplomatic supporter of the Iraqis during
the war with Iran.
Some of the smaller Gulf states also may be worried
about the stability and future of Saudi Arabia, although
the officials of these countries would be among the
last to admit this concern publicly. A long and bloody
series of terrorist events in Saudi Arabia during 2004
was viewed by some Gulf Arabs as at least suggesting
that a radical anti-monarchist regime could emerge
on the ashes of the House of Saud in the aftermath
of a successful revolution. The fall of the Saudi
monarchy would have seismic effects on the small
countries surrounding that country, and any successor
government would probably look with distain on the
remaining monarchies of the Gulf.
Despite these common concerns, the smaller Gulf
states must be considered individually since they
maintain discrete as well as collective defense concerns
that have led them to seek defense partnerships with
the United States. The states, considered below, are now
among the most important U.S. security partners.
Qatar.
Qatar is a small and wealthy GCC monarchy with
a long history of political and military cooperation
with the United States and other Western states. Like
its neighbors, Bahrain and the UAE, Qatar became
independent from Great Britain in 1971. At the time
of its independence, Qatar already had moved
forward dramatically in the transition from the deeply
impoverished state of the 1930s to one of the wealthiest
per capita countries in the world. Currently, the Qatari
population is almost 900,000, but less than 30 percent
of these people are Qatari citizens. The rest are guest
workers.165
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Oil was discovered in Qatar in 1939, although
exploitation was delayed by World War II. After the war,
oil revenues began funding the radical expansion and
modernization of the Qatari infrastructure. Eventually
Qatar’s petroleum resources were seriously depleted,
but these problems were rendered insignificant by
Qatari exploitation of natural gas. Qatar is now known
to possess the world’s third largest independent natural
gas deposits.166 By the 1990s, Qatar’s modernization
fed by this wealth was such that it had emerged as one
of the world’s most lavish welfare states. Yet, because
of limited human resources, Qatar has only a cosmetic
capacity for self-defense. Qatar, correspondingly,
became a rich potential prize for any aggressive regional
power and thus has a clear need for the support of an
external protector. It is inconceivable that this country
could ever develop its own military resources to the
point that they could defend the country in a military
conflict with one of its larger neighbors.
A key set of defining events for Qatari foreign
policy was the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the
subsequent 1991 war to liberate Kuwait. Following the
1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Doha sided decisively
with the U.S.-led coalition. Qatar announced that it
would allow coalition troops on its soil, and Qatari
military forces were sent to participate in the military
campaign to the extent that their limited numbers
allowed. Perhaps surprisingly, given their small
numbers, these troops found themselves involved
in the Battle of Khafji, Saddam’s only major effort
at offensive ground action against coalition forces
during the war (involving the elements of two Iraqi
divisions).167 The Qataris fought bravely during the
battle, and at one point a force of 22 Qatari tanks and
a battalion of Saudi infantry led two separate but
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unsuccessful attacks to retake the town of Khafji from
the Iraqi force. Unfortunately, Qatari forces also made
a number of serious tactical mistakes throughout the
battle, including firing on Saudi armored vehicles that
were misidentified as Iraqi.168 Khafji was not retaken
until U.S. airpower and artillery strikes had pulverized
the Iraqi defense thoroughly, thereby allowing Qatari
and Saudi forces to return there on the third effort to
take the city.169
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly for a wealthy state,
there has been relatively little military modernization
and expansion in the Qatari armed forces since the 1991
war, and there has been no serious movement to begin
purchasing militarily significant quantities of U.S.
weapons. The size of the military also has remained
small, with about 12,000 personnel, of which 8,500 are
in the army. The Qataris did, however, sign a bilateral
defense cooperation agreement with the United States
in 1995. This agreement reverses the previous Qatari
policy of remaining distant from the major powers,
such as Kuwait had done prior to 1990. Moreover, Doha
has made serious efforts to develop and consolidate
strong U.S. military ties since 1995, and this effort is
clearly the most important pillar of Qatar’s national
security policy. According to the Qatari Foreign
Minister, “We need the United States here in Qatar,
and the United States needs us.”170 The Qataris also
have sought to expand friendly relations and, in some
cases, security ties with numerous Arab, European, and
other states as a hedge against international isolation
in a crisis. Interestingly, Qatar also maintains an overt
and strong trading relationship with Israel, although
Doha is careful to direct sympathy and support to the
Palestinians as well.171
Although Qatar was publicly opposed to the
initiation of U.S. hostilities with Iraq in 2003, this
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opposition never seemed all that serious and may
have been confined to occasional vacuous rhetoric in
public forums. Prior to the war, former Qatari Justice
Minister Najeeb al Nauimi stated, “Anything is better
than that man [Saddam] . . . For now, the interests
of the Iraqis coincide with those of the Americans,
and the Iraqi people should take advantage of this
before the Americans change their minds.”172 Even
more authoritatively, the emir of Qatar privately told
the former Commander of U.S. Central Command,
“General Franks, you have the opportunity to save
the Iraqi people.”173 The contradiction between these
statements and some public statements about avoiding
war is comprehensible when considering that Qatar
wants a special relationship with the United States, but
does not wish to take public stands that unnecessarily
antagonize its neighbors. Additionally, Qatari leaders
did not wish to make belligerent statements in public
so long as they believed that a chance remained for a
last minute U.S.-Iraqi deal that left Saddam in power.
In an especially important display of pre-war U.S.Qatari cooperation, the CENTCOM forward command
headquarters was moved to Camp as Saliya, Qatar, in
late 2002.174 Prior to this move, Camp as Saliyah had
served primarily as a military depot for U.S. forces
operating in the Gulf, and it also was used as a staging
area for U.S. forces fighting in Afghanistan.175 The
Qataris made serious overtures to the United States to
encourage this move despite the likely possibility of
a new U.S.-Iraqi war. The arrangement has continued
since that time and seems to work well. Camp as Saliyah
on the edge of Doha, nevertheless, was not envisioned
by either country as a permanent base. It is the smaller
of the two major U.S. bases in Qatar and is expected to
close over the next several years due to its position on
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valuable real estate and the temporary nature of many
of its structures and facilities. U.S. forces at Camp as
Saliyah will be stationed elsewhere in Qatar without
any planned reduction in the total size of U.S. forces in
that country.
Qatar’s al Udeid Air Base is a much more important
asset for supporting U.S. strategy in the region. Al Udeid
has the longest runway in the Middle East (15,000 feet)
and was built by the Qataris at a cost of $1 billion.176
Since Qatar has an exceptionally small air force, it seems
safe to assume that Doha built this facility as a way to
improve its military relations with the United States
and safeguard its own security by serving as a host
country to a large and powerful U.S. military presence.
Al Udeid played an important role in supporting U.S.
air operations during the U.S.-led war to oust the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, although this was not
well-known at the time. Additionally, the base proved
exceptionally valuable during the conventional stage
of the Iraq war. As the insurgency in Iraq intensified,
the al Udeid Air base also has remained important to
the United States to support ongoing operations in
that country. Increased airlifts of supplies from Qatar
to Iraq were initiated to reduce the number of more
vulnerable supply convoys.177 The U.S. Navy also
cooperates with Qatari authorities, who support a
number of port visits. Currently, Qatar does not have
an aircraft carrier capable port, although it is expanding
its current port facilities in Doha and is expected to be
able to accommodate a U.S. attack carrier within a few
years, if both states find this advantageous.
The U.S.-Qatari relationship seems to be moving
forward despite the potential problems with U.S.Arab relations over the continuation of the Iraq war.
President Bush visited Qatar in June 2003 as part of a
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wider Middle Eastern tour. He was the first serving
U.S. president to do so.178 In another example of good
bilateral relations, the emir of Qatar gave $100 million
to the U.S. victims of Hurricane Katrina in the aftermath
of the disaster in August 2005.179 The United States
also appears satisfied that Qatar is stable and making
satisfactory progress toward democratic government.
Although the current emir came to power in a coup
d’etat against his father on June 27, 1995, he appears
to have made considerable progress in uniting the
population behind him.180 Qatar also is engaging in
some efforts at political reform. In April 2003, voters
approved a new constitution which creates a 45member parliament, with 30 elected members and
the rest selected by the emir. Additionally, Qatar
formally lifted censorship of the media in 1995 and has
abolished its Ministry of Information, which previously
had performed that function.181 Although informal
censorship still exists on subjects related to Qatari
governance, Qatar nevertheless has one of the least
censored medias in the Middle East.182 This situation
sometimes has angered the United States because of the
freewheeling aspects of the al Jazeera satellite television
network, but this highly controversial station may
provide Qatar with the political cover to maintain its
expanded military relationship with the United States.
It also serves as a vehicle—really a weapon—for Qatar
to defend itself against hostile regional criticism of its
friendly relations with the United States and its trade
relationship with Israel.
Serious post-Saddam threats also bind the United
States and Qatar together. These concerns center on the
danger of a more assertive Iran and an insufficiently
stabilized Iraq or a new Iraqi dictatorship. Of these
threats, Iran is the most serious Qatari concern due to its

53

location directly across the Gulf. The Qatari leadership,
while distrustful of Iran, also has attempted to manage
relations with Tehran in ways that minimize friction
between the two nations.183 These efforts appear to
have been largely successful, and no recent serious
tensions have occurred in the relationship between the
two countries. Nevertheless, Qatar is aware of its own
vulnerability to Iranian military operations should
the Iranians feel that such attacks would be in their
interests.
While not a threat in the same sense as Iran, Qatar
also has a series of ongoing problems with Saudi
Arabia. Strong ties with the United States and a variety
of other nations may be deemed useful in giving the
Qataris the leverage and self-confidence to argue their
cases more forcefully in their interactions with Riyadh.
The Saudis at various times have become especially
angry with Doha over such issues as the occasionally
unfavorable portrayal of Saudi Arabia by Qatar’s al
Jazeera satellite television.184 Relations also have been
reported to have been strained by Saudi disapproval of
Qatar’s economic relations with Israel.185 The Qataris,
for their part, are unhappy with Saudi backing for a
1996 attempted countercoup designed to reinstall the
father of the current emir.186 Many Qatari officials also
have expressed exasperation with the “big brother/
little brother” relationship they sometimes suggest
characterizes Saudi Arabian attitudes toward their
country.187
On the domestic front, Qatar has had only limited
problems with terrorism, but it does have some.188 In
June 2005, Jonathan Adams, a British drama teacher,
was killed in Doha, and 12 other people were wounded
in a suicide car bombing by an Egyptian expatriate
working for Qatar Petroleum.189 The Qatari government
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responded to the attack by urging its citizens and
expatriates to join a “Rally of Indignation” protesting
the murder of a British citizen.190 Pro-Western posters
were put up, and full-page ads in Qatari newspapers
offered condolences to Adams’ widow and children.
U.S. military leaders, including CENTCOM’s Major
General John Castellaw, have stated in 2005 that
Qatar is working well with the United States to fight
terrorism.191
Qatari citizens consistently seem much more willing
to accept a U.S. military presence than a variety of other
Arabs, and no serious Qatari opposition to the U.S.
presence appears to have developed despite ongoing
U.S.-Arab differences over a variety of political and
policy issues. U.S. policy in Qatar also seeks to avoid
antagonizing the local culture to the greatest extent
possible. Qataris call themselves Wahhabi Muslims, but
their behavior and approach to Islam is nevertheless
much less puritanical than the type of Wahhabi Islam
found in Saudi Arabia. Women can drive cars, and
some have chosen to wear Western-style dress. The
current emir has stated that his two daughters are free
to choose their own style of dress, and that one has
chosen Western-style dress, while the other favors
traditional clothing. The difference between the Qatari
and Saudi outlook is sometimes ascribed to a Qatari
history of seaborne trade which has caused them to
have a much wider set of interactions with foreign
values and ideas than the more insular Saudis.192
United Arab Emirates.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a collection
of seven emirates which have formed a federal
government and functioned as a single state since
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December 1971. Prior to 1971, the UAE sheikhdoms
were known as the Trucial States and had separate
treaty relations with the United Kingdom (UK). The
UK military presence in the Trucial States (except for
a small number of military advisors) had been phased
out over the years following the United Kingdom’s
1967 announcement to withdraw major military units
stationed east of Suez by 1971.193 The country itself
currently has a population of only around three million
people, of which up to 80 percent are resident foreigners.
The UAE is one of the wealthiest countries in the world,
and has been careful to structure its international
relations to facilitate widespread international and
particularly Western concern about any national
security threat to the UAE. To this end, the UAE has
invited massive Western investment and building,
made large purchases including military purchases
from Western countries, engaged in symbolic acts of
friendship, and sought other forms of cooperation.194
Moreover, the UAE, and especially its constituent
emirate of Dubai, has hosted a variety of international
conferences, events, and festivals designed to raise the
international profile of the state and perhaps increase
the ranks of its international supporters.195
These precautions seem wise since serious national
security concerns do exist. In particular, the UAE
leadership is uneasy about Iranian intentions, and the
Emirati leadership also is concerned that problems
arising from Iraqi insecurity might affect the country.
The Iranian claim to three Gulf islands which it took
from the UAE emirates of Ras al-Khayma and Sharja
in 1971 is a continuing problem in UAE-Iranian
relations.196 At least some elements within the UAE
appear to remain angry and distrustful of Iran over the
islands issue, with both sides asserting strong claims
of sovereignty to the area. The UAE has attempted
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to pursue this issue through the International Court
of Justice, but no real progress has been made. Like
some of the other Gulf states, the UAE has displayed a
superficial willingness to work with the Iranians, and
the UAE emirate of Dubai has a large ethnic Iranian
minority. Nevertheless, Emirati pragmatism about
Iran does not equal trust.
In 1994 the UAE signed a military cooperation
agreement with the United States, and it has similar
agreements with the UK and France.197 The UAE also
has a significantly larger and more modern military
than most of the other small Gulf states.198 Unlike Qatar,
UAE clearly is willing to spend significant resources
on military modernization. To this end, the Emirati
Ministry of Defense recently has purchased 80 F-16
fighter aircraft from the United States, the first of which
were delivered in May 2005. These “Desert Falcons”
were developed with the UAE contributing $2 billion
to the cost of new technologies associated with their
components and systems.199 Nevertheless, the UAE
appears to be plagued by what Middle East security
expert Anthony Cordesman refers to as the “glitter
factor.” Elaborating on this problem, Cordesman
suggests that the UAE seems more determined to make
expensive showcase purchases than to develop serious
military capabilities.200 Such concerns are serious,
particularly since the UAE has only limited human
resources to apply to the needs of national defense.
The military itself draws its manpower heavily from
its five less wealthy northern and eastern emirates but
also must include foreign expatriate soldiers at the
lower enlisted ranks.201
The crisis in the international system created by
the 9/11 attacks against the United States caused the
UAE to seek new ways to strengthen relations with the
United States and the West. The U.S.-UAE relationship
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is a core element of UAE foreign policy, and in the
aftermath of the strikes appeared to be threatened
because the UAE had maintained normal ties with
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and because two
of the 9/11 highjackers were Emiratis.202 The ties with
the Taliban particularly were embarrassing to the
UAE since they resulted from an act of official policy,
and UAE-Afghan diplomatic relations were severed
quickly. These ties originally had been established
at the urgings of Pakistan in 1997 before Bin Laden
appeared to be a serious threat to the United States.203
The UAE later complied with UN sanctions initiated in
late 2000 against the Taliban government for continuing
to harbor Osama Bin Laden.204
A variety of U.S. commentators have raised
concerns about pre-9/11 UAE ties with the Taliban,
but these concerns must be placed in the context of the
regional situation. The high point of UAE-Taliban ties
came at the time when the upheaval in Afghanistan
appeared to be a major distraction for Iranian foreign
policy away from the Gulf. In August 1998, Iran
appeared close to war with the Taliban regime after a
Taliban unit entered the Iranian Consulate in Mazare-Sharif and murdered 11 Iranian citizens including
diplomats, intelligence officers, and a journalist. These
murders occurred as part of much wider massacre of
Afghan Shi’ites (Hazaras) throughout the city in direct
retaliation for similar treatment directed at the Taliban
in 1997. While the crisis eventually subsided after the
temporary massing of around 200,000 Iranian troops
on the Afghan border, serious Iranian problems with
their eastern flank must have been viewed with some
favor by the UAE leadership.205
The UAE’s geopolitical reasons for flirting with Iran’s
Taliban enemies collapsed after 9/11, and the UAE, as
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noted, severed diplomatic relations with Afghanistan
within 2 weeks of the attacks. Additionally, UAE military facilities quickly were made available to the United
States for use in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the
U.S. bombing and invasion of Afghanistan. The UAE
also moved rapidly in ordering its financial institutions
to freeze the assets of 63 organizations and individuals
suspected by the United States of financing terrorist
movements.206 The UAE also was quick to welcome
the post-Taliban transformation of Afghanistan. UAEAfghan diplomatic relations were reestablished by then
interim Afghan leader Hamid Karzai in February 2002,
with the UAE pledging to provide economic assistance
to the new Afghan government.207 In another act of
solidarity, the UAE pledged $100 million in aid to the
U.S. victims of Hurricane Katrina.208
As with some of the other Gulf states, the UAE was
prepared to help the United States with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but the Emirati leadership also preferred
not to emphasize that role as a hedge to avoid antagonizing other Arab states and perhaps some elements of
their own indigenous and resident foreign population.
U.S. officials have stated that the UAE gave valuable
support to the war effort against Iraq by expanding the
Dhafra Air Base near Abu Dhabi and making it available
to coalition aircraft.209 This contribution became much
more widely known during the controversy that
followed the announcement of what was to be called
the Dubai Ports World controversy when incidents of
support to U.S. security operations in the Gulf were
posted on the White House web site.210
Currently, the UAE is one of the most reliable
allies that the United States has for providing military
facilities and logistical bases for U.S. forces in the region.
One of the most important of these facilities is the
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above-noted Dhafra Air Base. Around 1,500 American
military personnel live and work at this airbase, which
supports a variety of missions of considerable national
security value to the United States.211 Additionally, the
Dhafra Air Base is home to the Gulf Air Warfare Center,
a major training facility for a variety of allied pilots.212
According to British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
reporting, the UAE also allows U-2 (TR-1) high altitude
reconnaissance flights from this air base. This role was
highlighted tragically by the BBC in June 2005 when
they reported that one of these planes crashed after
having completed a mission in support of U.S. troops
in Afghanistan. According to the BBC, this aircraft
seems to have been lost for reasons other than enemy
fire.213
The UAE further provides important support to the
U.S. Navy. According to the White House, the UAE’s
Dubai port of Jebel Ali hosts hundreds of U.S. Navy
ships and, in total, supports more U.S. Navy ship visits
than conducted at any other non-U.S. port.214 Moreover,
Jebel Ali is considered one of the best equipped ports
to support U.S. Navy operations and the provisioning
of U.S. Navy ships.215 This provisioning involves
everything from fresh vegetables to fuel to spare parts.
This is the only facility among the smaller Arab Gulf
states which is able to accommodate a large U.S. attack
aircraft carrier, although these ships also are moored
off the coast of Bahrain, with members of the crew
going ashore ferried back and forth by small boat.216
Jebel Ali also is well-protected by a variety of antiterrorism measures.217
The UAE does not seem to have major problems
with terrorism, although there have been occasional
difficulties. These problems may increase as a result of
the UAE decision to side decisively with the United
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States in the war on terrorism. In March 2004, the
embassy in Abu Dhabi and the Consulate General in
Dubai suspended operations due to a “specific threat
to the embassy in Abu Dhabi.”218 Moreover, the UAE
has been directly threatened by al Qa’ida because of
its close relations with the West and particularly the
United States.219 It is easy to suspect that al Qa’ida has
become progressively angrier with the UAE in period
after 9/11 when it, as noted above, renounced ties to
the Taliban and began to crack down on questionable
money transactions in Dubai and other UAE banks. The
crackdown on money laundering seems particularly
problematic to al Qa’ida and involves the enforcement
of major new UAE banking and financial laws.220 The
UAE has been reported to be highly cooperative with
U.S. security officials on financial issues, and one
account by author Ron Suskind suggests that UAE
officials became perhaps even somewhat overzealous
in freezing suspect accounts.221
U.S.-UAE relations are subject to problems and
were disrupted over the controversy that followed the
announcement of the Dubai Ports World agreement,
but this damage will probably not be permanent. The
set of problems that became known as the Dubai Ports
World controversy involved a UAE company that
sought to acquire Britain’s Peninsular and Oriental
Steam Navigation (P&O) Corporation in a $6.8 billion
purchase. This purchase, by the third largest ports
company in the world, would allow Dubai Ports
World to take over the management of six major U.S.
ports—Newark, New York, Baltimore, New Orleans,
Miami, and Philadelphia. There was very little reason
to suspect that the deal would become controversial
since other U.S. port terminals have been managed by
companies from the United Kingdom, China, Japan,
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Singapore, and Taiwan.222 Additionally, the U.S. Coast
Guard, harbor police, U.S. Department of Customs,
port authorities, and other U.S. security organizations
would continue to control the physical security of the
ports, regardless of who operated them.223 The UAE
would not determine the workers to be hired at the
U.S. ports, who would instead be supplied by the
longshoreman’s union.224
Unfortunately, the agreement was controversial
despite the safeguards that it included. According
to U.S. reporters and public opinion specialists,
objections over the agreement were first seized upon by
incendiary “talk” radio commentators and soon spread
to influence U.S. public opinion.225 This is not the place
to examine the domestic politics of the deal except to
note that they were severe and presented a difficult
challenge to an administration attempting to treat an
Arab ally with friendship and respect. In considering
the acceptability of the deal, some critics maintained
that the UAE was enforcing the Arab League boycott
of Israel, and that this made them an unacceptable
political partner for the United States.226 Such charges
accurately reflected the formal UAE position on trade
and other economic interactions with Israel, but they
did not reflect the more subtle ways in which the UAE
can do business. Nor was the UAE prepared to let the
criticism stand. Shortly after the charges were leveled,
the head of Zim, Israel’s largest shipping company, sent
a letter supporting Dubai Ports World to a leading U.S.
Senator.227 The letter, which was quickly made public,
stated that the Board of Directors at Zim strongly
supported the deal, had done extensive business with
Dubai Ports World, and felt the Dubai Ports World
was an exceptionally solid partner. The letter almost
certainly was sent as the result of a UAE request.
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In response to the firestorm of criticism, Dubai
Ports World announced in March 2006 that it would
sell the rights to operate the six U.S. terminals to a
U.S. company within 6 months.228 The message sent to
the Arab World over this issue was abominable. Arab
allies would be treated with suspicion solely because
they were Arab. Nevertheless, in a valuable effort
to limit the damage of the DP controversy, the U.S.
Government approved a $1.24 billion UAE takeover
of Doncasters, a British engineering company with
U.S. plants that supply the Department of Defense.229
President Bush also declared his personal commitment
to improved relations with the UAE, stating, “In order
to win the war on terror, we’ve got to strengthen our
relationships and friendships with moderate Arab
countries in the Middle East. The UAE is a committed
ally in the war on terror. They are a key partner for our
military in a critical region.”230
Kuwait.
Kuwait has a native population of just fewer than
one million citizens and perhaps as many as two million
foreigners within the country. It also has 10 percent
of the world’s known oil reserves. The first of these
large oil reserves was discovered in 1937, and massive
infrastructure development based on oil revenues
began after the end of World War II. Like several other
small states in the region, Kuwait is both rich and
vulnerable, and this vulnerability was underscored in
the most tangible way when the country was invaded
and brutally occupied in 1990. Kuwait has been one
of the most important Arab allies of the United States
since the liberation of that country in 1991. The 1990
invasion and the subsequent Iraqi occupation were
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defining national traumas for Kuwait. The Kuwaitis,
correspondingly, have made great efforts to ensure
that such an event will never be repeated.
In the immediate aftermath of the 1991 liberation,
the U.S.-Kuwaiti relationship often was viewed by
both sides as a “special relationship,” with the two
countries drawn together by, among other things,
shared concern about Gulf security and residual Iraqi
troublemaking. In making the decision to consolidate
its military and political ties to the West, Kuwait
quietly discarded security agreements based on the
March 1991 “Damascus Declaration,” which called for
the protection of Kuwait by the indefinite stationing
of Egyptian and Syrian troops on its soil.231 This
“Arab forces” security option was disregarded by
the Kuwaitis as unreliable, expensive, and subject to
possible politicization within the context of inter-Arab
politics. Kuwait’s basic guarantee of security therefore
remained dependent on its relationship with the United
States, which it continually has sought to maintain and
improve. On April 1, 2004, Kuwait was made a “major
non-NATO ally,” a distinction it shares with about a
dozen other countries, which in the Middle East include
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel.232 In another recent
act of relationship maintenance, Kuwait, like many of
the other Gulf Arab states, pledged financial assistance
to the victims of Hurricane Katrina. The Kuwaitis
promised $100 million and an additional $400 million
in oil products.233
The Kuwaiti leadership also attempted to modernize
the armed forces following the 1991 war when that
force’s military shortcomings rapidly became clear.
Kuwaiti forces at the time of the invasion were too
small and unprepared to serve as much of an obstacle
when the Iraqis struck. Kuwaiti units therefore were
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unable to cause the Iraqis more than minor delays, and
most of the ground forces rapidly fell apart.234 Many of
Kuwait’s 20,000 ground troops were killed or captured,
although up to 7,000 soldiers escaped across the Saudi
border. Some units of the Kuwaiti Air Force operating
from the southern part of their country attacked
advancing Iraqi armored and mechanized units before
their air base was overrun and they were forced to flee
to Saudi Arabia.235 Later, during the U.S.-led offensive
to retake that country, remaining Kuwaiti military
units were attached to other Arab forces in supporting
this effort.236
In the aftermath of the 1991 war, the Kuwaitis
moved to improve their military forces as well as
their relations with Western and other global powers,
although Kuwait also had difficulties meeting its own
self-defense goals. Kuwait purchased U.S.-made F-18
Hornet aircraft and expanded its military to include a
number of U.S.-equipped ground force brigades, but
it also faced difficulty manning them and providing
them with appropriate levels of maintenance and
support. Anthony Cordesman has noted that with an
active duty force of 11,500 soldiers, Kuwait has only
enough troops to stand up two maneuver combat
brigades and that Kuwaiti brigades actually resemble
large battalions. Nevertheless, the Kuwaitis have
made a serious effort to work through these problems.
Cordesman also notes that Kuwaiti training as of 2003
had been effective at the brigade and squadron level,
and the ability of these units to deploy and fight had
risen significantly.237
Kuwaiti concern about Iraq after 1991 also was
reinforced periodically by threatening gestures toward
that country by the Saddam regime. One particularly
notable confrontation occurred in October 1994 when
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the Iraqis moved two Republican Guard divisions
from areas around Baghdad to positions about 12 miles
from the Kuwaiti border.238 The United States, as noted
earlier, responded to the crisis by rushing troops to the
area to serve as a deterrent against Iraqi aggression.
Another crisis occurred in February 1998, when U.S.
troop strength in Kuwait was increased in preparation
to any Iraqi counterstrike after the beginning of
Operation DESERT FOX. The U.S. decision to punish
Saddam for his noncooperation with UN weapons
inspectors also carried the risk that he would lash out
at pro-American states such as Kuwait. In both cases,
Iraq prudently chose not to strike at Kuwait, apparently
understanding that it would not benefit from a process
of military escalation with the United States.
Due to their hatred and fear of Saddam, the
Kuwaitis were the most supportive of any Arab
country in backing the planned invasion of Iraq in
2003. In the preparation phase for the coming war,
Kuwaiti bases hosting U.S. and other coalition troops
occupied over one-quarter of the country by providing
space for military encampments, training facilities, and
artillery ranges.239 Kuwait also supplied U.S. military
forces entering into Iraq with fuel for their vehicles
and equipment at no cost. Later, the Kuwaitis sought
nominal payment for fuel supplied to U.S. forces
remaining in Iraq after Saddam’s ouster.240 Kuwaitis
still refer to the 2003 invasion as the “liberation of
Iraq,” terminology almost never found elsewhere
in the Arab World. Nor were they hesitant about
asserting the importance of this phrase in March 2003
when the UAE-based pan Arab television station, al
Arabiya, described the conflict only as the “third gulf
war.” Angry that the conflict was not referred to as
“the liberation of Iraq,” Kuwaiti backers of the station
pulled a quarter of its funding.241
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Despite their enthusiasm for Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, many Kuwaitis are deeply uncertain about
the future of Iraq and how still unfolding events there
ultimately will affect them. While virtually all Kuwaitis
were delighted to see Saddam removed from power,
they also recognize that problems with Iraq could continue to grow and develop in the aftermath of Saddam’s
ouster. While Kuwait strongly and openly supported
the U.S. decision to oust Saddam, some Kuwaitis are
angry with what they see as a botched occupation
that was based on minimal planning and coordination
with allies in the region.242 They also worry about the
possibility of another Iraqi strongman emerging from
a divided and unstable Iraq. Two Iraqi heads of state
prior to Saddam (King Ghazi and Brigadier Abdul
Karim Qassim) claimed that Kuwait was a part of Iraq
which needed to be restored to the homeland.243 King
Ghazi, who ruled Iraq as a restless British client in the
late 1930s, demanded Kuwait’s annexation in public
statements and attempted to incite Kuwaitis against
their local leaders while the country was still a British
protectorate.244 Even more seriously, Brigadier Qassim
publicly threatened to invade Kuwait and restore it to
the Iraqi homeland by military force after the British
granted the country independence in 1961. Qassim’s
threats prompted British and later Arab League forces
to be stationed in Kuwait to deter an Iraqi invasion.245
The belief that Iraqi designs on Kuwait will not end
with Saddam is therefore not surprising and may well
be correct.
In the past, Kuwait at times has viewed a rough
balance of power between Iraq and Iran as having
some positive aspects, although this view changed in
1991. Iraq invaded Kuwait at a time when Iran had
been weakened severely by the Iran-Iraq war and was
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not in a position to respond to the crisis. A weakened
Iran thus helped to empower a strong and aggressive
Iraq. Nevertheless, when Iraq received an unexpectedly
strong response from the United States, Baghdad
quickly renegotiated its relationship with Iran, making
a variety of territorial and other concessions to Tehran
in order to redeploy its troops to face potential combat
against the United States and its allies. The 1991 war left
Saddam severely crippled, but he was still considered
Kuwait’s deadliest enemy until his ouster in 2003.
In the aftermath of Saddam’s ouster, Iran has
emerged as the strongest of the Gulf regional powers.
Unfortunately, the political leadership in Tehran has
become more extreme over the last few years with
the marginalization of the Iranian reform movement
and the elevation of additional hardliners such as
Iranian President Amadinejad. Additionally, Kuwait
has a troubling history with Iran that was set aside
in recent years due to the more serious threat of
Saddam Hussein. During the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait
was threatened repeatedly by the Tehran government
for its support of Iraq, and Iranian-supported terrorist
activities in Kuwait emerged as a serious problem.
On one occasion, the Kuwaiti emir was targeted in an
unsuccessful assassination attempt that the Kuwaitis
believe was Iranian supported.246 In some instances,
the Iranian Air Force “mistakenly” bombed targets in
Kuwait.247 Kuwaiti problems with Iraq, therefore, have
not made them comfortable with a resurgent Iran, and
this concern provides additional support for the policy
of U.S. troops remaining with the country.
The U.S. military currently maintains troops
scattered throughout around 10 bases in Kuwait, the
most important of which are Camp Buehring and
Camp Arifjan. Previously the centerpiece of the U.S.
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presence in Kuwait was Camp Doha, but this facility
had been closed almost completely by early 2006, with
the Camp Doha operations transferred to other bases in
Kuwait that are farther away from civilian population
centers.248 Camp Doha was never envisioned to be a
permanent base, and the movement to Camp Arifjan
constitutes an effort to further lower the profile of U.S.
troops in Kuwait. Some Kuwaitis have previously
expressed concern that the U.S. military presence
is exceptionally visible to the local citizenry, unlike
during the early 1960s when British troops in Kuwait
appeared virtually invisible. Both the U.S. and Kuwaiti
governments seek to limit the U.S. public profile in the
country as a way of minimizing any strengthening of
the political opposition to their presence.
On the domestic front, Kuwait is a stable country
which handled a contentious succession crisis in 2006
with dignity and consensus.249 Varying degrees of
political freedom also have existed throughout Kuwaiti
post-independence history. The Kuwaiti parliament
was created by the 1962 Constitution, and the Parliament
operated sporadically from 1963 to 1990 and almost
continuously from 1992 on. Kuwait also has a strong
reformist movement which is well-represented in the
Parliament. Upon occasion, the Parliament can be quite
assertive in confronting the monarchy.250 Kuwait also
has an ongoing reform movement and granted women
the right to vote in 2005.
The Kuwaiti population is about 25-30 percent
Shi’ite, and this group traditionally has been outside
of the governmental power structure. In recent years,
Kuwaiti Shi’ites have suffered discrimination and
remain outside of the inner circles of power, but the
Kuwaiti government also has taken a number of steps
to integrate them more fully into the political life of the
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state and to give them a stake in the future of the Kuwaiti
political entity.251 Kuwaiti policies toward their Shi’ites
often appear particularly enlightened when compared
to those of Saudi Arabia and, to some extent, Bahrain.252
A key moment of Shi’ite choice was the aftermath of
the 1990 Iraqi invasion when Kuwaiti Shi’ites formed
an important part of the underground resistance to the
Iraqi occupation, establishing themselves among the
foremost Kuwaiti nationalists.253
A small number of Kuwaitis and noncitizen
residents of Kuwait disapprove of that country’s role
as a springboard for the 2003 invasion and object to the
continuing presence of 25,000 U.S. troops in Kuwait.254
Most of these oppositionists appear to be Islamists, and
there is a fringe of violent radicals. Al Qa’ida has a few
Kuwaitis, and a former al Qa’ida spokesman, Suleiman
Abu al Ghaith, was a Kuwaiti who lost his citizenship
in 2001.255 Other members of al Qa’ida appear to have
grown up in Kuwait as the children of foreign workers,
including the operational mastermind of the 9/11
attacks, Khaled Sheikh Mohammad, and his nephew,
Ramzi Yousef, one of the planners of the first World
Trade Center attack in 1993.256 Both of these individuals
are Pakistani citizens. There also have been shoot-outs
between the police and the armed Islamic extremists
within Kuwait.257 One of the most important of these
confrontations was the “Peninsula Lions” incident of
January 2005. This episode involved a 3-day gun battle
between Kuwaiti police and antigovernment radicals,
often identified as associates of al-Qa’ida. Four
policemen and two civilian bystanders were killed
in this battle, along with eight of the terrorists. Ten
policemen also were wounded in the clash which was
unprecedented in Kuwaiti history. Six of the terrorists
captured in this attack were sentenced to death by
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hanging in December 2005. Twenty-two others were
given prison sentences ranging from 4 months to 15
years.258 Thus while terrorist problems within Kuwait
currently are manageable, the Kuwaiti government
also clearly needs continuing U.S. counterterrorism
support.
Bahrain.
Bahrain is a small nation composed of a 36-island
archipelago, with around 700,000 citizens and residents. The four main islands are joined by causeways,
and include about 95 percent of Bahrain’s total land
area. Like a variety of other Gulf Arab states, Bahrain
did not become independent from Great Britain until
1971. The Khalifa ruling family which assumed power
upon the departure of British forces has been in place
as Bahrain’s national leadership for 2 centuries.259
Although the ruling family is Sunni Muslim, around 70
percent of the citizens of Bahrain are Shi’ites. There are
around 235,000 foreign workers, many of whom come
from South Asia. Bahrain is not a wealthy state, and
most of its oil reserves already have been depleted.
While none of the Gulf Arab states have a serious
capacity for self-defense, Bahrain is the smallest of the
GCC countries and almost certainly the most helpless.
Manama’s limited financial resources also make largescale military purchases impossible, and the Bahraini
government may have concerns about expanding
the military in ways which significantly increase the
representation of Shi’ites in the army. Currently, the
army includes a number of foreign nationals including
Pakistanis, Jordanians, Syrians, and Yemenis.260 This
situation seems to leave foreign alliances as the only
serious way of approaching external defense. Thus, as
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Bahrain began to loosen its relationship with London,
the need for friendly relations with the United States
became increasingly important.
The U.S. Naval presence in Bahrain has existed
continuously since 1949 and thus pre-dates Bahraini
independence.261 On October 27, 1991, the U.S.Bahraini relationship was strengthened and given
greater depth with the signing of a new military
cooperation agreement providing for port facilities and
joint military exercises.262 Bahrain is the headquarters
for the U.S. Fifth Fleet (also known as the Naval
Support Activity, Bahrain) and NAVCENT, the naval
component of the U.S. Central Command. Bahrain
provided major basing and support facilities on a
number of occasions, including the “tanker war” with
Iran in the late 1980s, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003
invasion of Iraq.263 Bahrain also sent a small symbolic
force to participate in Operation DESERT SHIELD and
Operation DESERT STORM in 1990-91.264 Dredging
is taking place in Manama Harbor to allow it to more
easily accommodate warships. On March 25, 2002,
President Bush designated Bahrain as a “major nonNATO U.S. ally.”265
Bahrain is within 8 minutes flying time from Iran,
and concerns about Iran are central to Manama’s
assessments of possible dangers to its independence
and security. Iran, under the rule of the last shah, raised
claims to sovereignty over Bahrain as the UK moved
increasingly close to granting its independence.266 The
shah eventually recognized Bahrain’s forthcoming
independence in 1970, but considerable residual fear
existed that Tehran would reassert itself if it could
do so without a substantial regional or international
uproar.267 Bahrain was an Iranian possession between
1602 and 1783.
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The overthrow of Iran’s last shah in 1979 did not lead
to better Bahraini-Iranian relations, and instead caused
Manama’s relations with Tehran to fall to a new low
due to the assertiveness of the Iranian revolutionaries.
In the exuberance of the young revolution, leading
spokesmen of the Islamic Republic briefly reasserted
claim to Bahrain, although these claims received little
rhetorical follow-up and seemed to fade relatively
quickly.268 More seriously, in December 1981, 73
Bahrainis were arrested and accused of planning a
coup against the Bahraini government. They also
were charged with being members of the Tehranbased Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and
coordinating their subversive actions with Tehran.269
Iran vehemently denied involvement in the effort to
overthrow the government.270 While Iran and Bahrain
were later able to normalize their relations, this is a
troubling history.
Some journalistic reports suggest that Iran directed
strong pressure at Bahrain to oppose publicly the 2003
U.S. intervention in Iraq.271 Thus, it is hardly surprising
that in August 2002, the king of Bahrain issued a
joint statement with Iran’s leadership opposing any
“unilateral” military strike against Iraq.272 While Tehran
had little use for the Saddam Hussein regime, its leaders
were concerned that the United States, by defeating
Saddam, could encircle Iran with pro-American
regimes from Afghanistan to Iraq, thus threatening the
Islamic Republic. Bahraini leaders apparently felt the
need to show at least cosmetic solidarity with Iran over
this issue. In a related effort, Manama subsequently
made a last-minute asylum offer to Saddam Hussein in
what it presented as an effort to avoid war while also
ending the Saddam regime. This offer may not have
been particularly serious and was only made after
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Saddam has stated unequivocally that he would rather
die than go into exile.273 While the Bahrainis remain
willing to make these sorts of gestures, they almost
certainly would never trust Iran to the extent of failing
to maintain strong security ties with the United States
or another outside power.
The caution noted above can be seen in at least one
of Bahrain’s other regional relationships, the one with
Saudi Arabia. Bahrain, unlike Qatar, does not have the
luxury of asserting a great deal of independence from
Saudi Arabia, when the larger nation wishes to assert
its regional clout. Despite their geographical proximity,
Bahrain and Qatar have overwhelming differences in
their political and economic situations. While Qatar is
a wealthy country that is getting wealthier, Bahrain,
as noted, has much more limited resources. Moreover,
Bahrain’s economic problems have made it somewhat
dependent upon Saudi Arabia, which provides
support to Manama in several important ways. One
of these involves the King Fahd causeway (opened in
1986) which connects Bahrain to Saudi Arabia and is
used for over 2,300,000 car trips per year.274 A variety
of Saudi tourists come to Bahrain via the causeway,
and they often spend significant amounts of money
there. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has granted Bahrain
the right to exploit the Abu Safa offshore oil field.
Previously the two countries shared the revenues of
this resource.275 While Bahrain clearly is grateful for
Saudi support, a relationship with the United States is a
valuable counterweight to complete Saudi domination
of its much smaller neighbor.
Bahrain is a moderately stable nation which, at
times, displays some pluralistic tendencies, although
substantial problems exist over issues such as Shi’ite
representation in parliament. Reform also is an up
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and down process in Bahrain, with some observers
suggesting Manama is unable to make more than
cosmetic efforts to more fully enfranchise Shi’ites.276
Bahrain, unlike the other small Gulf Arab states, has
a substantial Shi’ite majority (around 70 percent of the
population), and granting them true equality could
lead to a divided government with a Sunni monarchy
and Shi’ite-controlled parliament. Such a prospect also
is of concern to Bahrain’s privileged Sunni Arabs, most
of whom have grown comfortable with a system that
allows them to dominate the majority Shi’ites. The
government further is concerned about deepening
sectarian violence in Iraq aggravating sectarian
problems in Bahrain. During the 1990s, there was
considerable sectarian strife in Bahrain after Shi’ites
began a protest campaign for greater political rights
in late 1994. This campaign led to disturbances and a
tough government crackdown.277 By 1999, the cycle of
anti-regime unrest and massive government repression
seemed to have concluded, and some hopes existed for
the peaceful expansion of Shi’ite rights.
Bahrain’s political culture also allows demonstrations which are usually small and sometimes at odds
with each other. Anti-Israeli demonstrations occur that
occasionally involve speeches and slogans opposing
the continued U.S. military presence in Bahrain.278 This
is probably an effort to express anger over various
Israeli actions rather than a serious call to change the
U.S.-Bahraini relationship in any fundamental way.
Bahraini officials have urged people to limit their
criticism and not to burn the U.S. flag during protests
because they fear that such actions would harm their
relations with the United States.279 Some Bahraini
protestors even have considered waving the U.S. flag
at their demonstrations as part of a call for democracy,
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but they ultimately rejected doing so because this
appeared to invite foreign intervention in a domestic
dispute.280 Additionally, since Bahrain is not a rich
country, issues of the equitable sharing of U.S. rental
fees for the use of Bahraini port and basing facilities is
an ongoing political issue.
Bahrain’s political turmoil has on occasion affected
U.S. military operations there. In July 2004, the U.S.
Department of Defense approved the temporary
relocation of family members and nonemergency
personnel from Bahrain.281 This decision was made
because of concerns about Sunni Muslim terrorists
rather than Shi’ite unrest. The 2004 decision to
evacuate U.S. dependents nevertheless mortified the
Bahraini leadership. Bahraini Defense Minister Bin
Hamad, after careful consultation with U.S. officials,
stated that the withdrawal was limited to families
and purely a “precautionary measure” in response
to al Qa’ida threats. He maintained that “Bahrain is
safe. We are not lax and will not be lax with terror.
Our forces are capable of deterring every danger.”282
In October 2005 outgoing Fifth Fleet commander Rear
Admiral David Nichols stated that Bahrain would
remain a permanent home for the Fifth Fleet, and that
reports it would be moved to Qatar were baseless.283
The nonviolent Bahraini opposition usually does not
raise the basing issue as a point of disagreement with
the government, and the presence of U.S. military
forces also may help the two sides remain peaceful
in their disagreement, since unrest and bloodshed
could provoke another temporary relocation order or,
in extreme circumstances, could cause NAVCENT to
consider relocating its headquarters.
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Oman.
Oman maintains a highly strategic position in the
Gulf region. The country has a long history of cooperation with the United States and United Kingdom,
although it seeks to maintain these ties in an
inconspicuous way. Additionally, Oman, with a territory the size of Kansas and around 3 million residents,
is somewhat larger than some of the other Gulf states.
Around 600,000 of its residents are noncitizen foreign
nationals. 284 Oman produces limited amounts of oil,
but it also is one of the less prosperous members of the
GCC. Oman also has a bit more military muscle than
most of the Arab Gulf states (at least regarding size),
with 41,000 active duty personal in its armed forces,
including 25,000 in the army.
Oman is a moderate Arab country with long
history of concern about revolutionary Iran. Muscat
previously had maintained extremely close relations
with the Shah of Iran, who provided some military
forces to assist the Omanis in putting down a long and
difficult rebellion in their province of Dhofar.285 This
rebellion began in 1962 and ended in 1975 after years
of difficult fighting. In the aftermath of the Iranian
revolution, the Iranian and Omani navies shadowed
each other, and the Iranians violated Omani territorial
waters.286 Oman has been discretely supportive of the
Arab-Israeli peace process and was one of the few Arab
nations to support Egyptian President Sadat’s 1977 trip
to Jerusalem to address the Israeli Knesset.
In 2000, Oman renewed its 10-year defense
agreement with the United States, which it initially
accepted in 1979. This agreement allows the U.S. military to base aircraft at three Omani air bases, Seeb,
Masirah Island, and Thumrait. The agreement also
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allows the United States to preposition military
equipment.287 In 2003 the U.S. presence in Oman fell
to around 3,750 from about 4,300 during Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM in 2002. By 2006, there were
only around 26 U.S. personnel stationed in Oman,
indicating that Omani facilities are no longer being
used to support operations in Afghanistan or Iraq.
Most of the U.S. military personnel stationed in Oman
were members of the Air Force.288 U.S. aircraft stationed
there during the high point of hostilities included B-1
bombers and C-130 transport aircraft. There has been
little apparent public opposition to the U.S. presence in
Oman during 2002-03 when military operations from
that country were at their high point.
The United States has continued to maintain
extensive prepositioning facilities on the Omani island
of Masirah.289 Oman also appears stable, and the
current sultan has been in power since 1970. There is no
designated successor to the sultan in Oman, although
Sultan Qaboos has written his preference in a letter to
be opened after his death if the sultanate’s notables
cannot agree on a successor.
CONCLUSIONS
Relations between the United States and the Arab
World were at a particularly low level at the time this
report was written due to ongoing differences over the
Iraq war, the war on terrorism, the Israeli/Palestinian
conflict, and the aftermath of a crisis in Lebanon.
Yet, the United States has highly significant interests
and important allies in the region which cannot be
neglected. The challenge for the United States remains
to support its allies and its national interests without
adding to its already serious difficulties in the region
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through actions which inadvertently support the
growth of radicalism in the area. The following policy
recommendations are offered with these concerns in
mind.
1. The United States should treat basing rights
and democratization as issues that must be balanced
and rationalized. This will not be easy in all cases.
Sometimes incomplete and distorted democracy may
have to be acknowledged as better than instability and
violence. New and more virulent forms of repressive
regimes sometimes result from the overthrow of
paternalist monarchies. There is no way for the United
States to maintain bases in the Arab world while totally
insulating itself from the political dynamics of the
region. Moreover, the United States does itself and its
allies no favors by allowing the issue of basing rights
to silence it on human rights and democratization.
2. The United States should not seek long-term
military facilities in Iraq, unless strongly implored
by a wide spectrum of the Iraqi leadership to do so.
The United States should conduct future strategic
planning on the assumption that U.S. bases in Iraq
will be turned over to the Iraqis in the mediumterm future. Large and important Arab states seeking
prestige and political leadership in the Arab World find
these bases to be a political burden. The United States
should seek military cooperation with any future Iraqi
government that is stable, inclusive of its citizenry,
and friendly in ways that do not involve permanent
bases. Nor is it clear what tactical advantage they
would provide, given the large number of other Gulf
states willing to allow U.S. basing rights currently. The
Egyptian, Jordanian, and now Saudi Arabian examples
of close security cooperation with the United States
without permanent basing rights could be particularly
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useful to draw upon should Iraq emerge as a U.S.
security partner. Additionally, in either a worst or
best case scenario, U.S. forces will have to evacuate
Iraqi bases. In a best case scenario, a self-confident
and united Iraq is expected to emerge, but this type
of nation will almost certainly return to its historic
patterns of seeking Arab leadership and displaying
independence from all foreign states. In a worst case
scenario, civil unrest in Iraq will spin out of control,
leaving an environment in which the United States
can no longer contain unrestrained Iraqi violence and
will almost certainly choose to withdraw. In a case of
low level civil unrest or ongoing insurgency, the Iraqis
would have difficulty explaining a semi-permanent
U.S. presence to their public or the wider Arab World
unless the alternative was seen as anarchy.
3. The United States must make a serious effort
to heal the rift between itself and the Arab World by
privately and publicly treating friendly Arab states
as our security partners and not our clients. That will
involve consulting them on a wide array of military
and nonmilitary issues throughout the region. There
also is a need to treat states with respect and courtesy,
which is important in the Arab World. U.S. officials
traveling to Iraq, for example, could help U.S.-Kuwaiti
relations if they used Kuwait as something more than
a site to refuel their aircraft. Stopping even for a few
hours to consult with Kuwaiti allies could avoid the
stigma of a great power that refuses to take smaller
nations seriously.
4. The United States now has what amounts to
a special relationship with Qatar that needs to be
continuously nurtured despite differences over
Al Jazeera satellite television. Qatar was willing to
expand its military relationship with the United States
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at a point when doing so was and remains enormously
unpopular in the wider Arab World. It also has relatively friendly relations with Israel, and this situation,
at least, suggests that it will be circumspect about
allowing the Israeli-Palestinian problem to overwhelm
other interests. Moreover, the Qatari emphasis on
addressing Palestinian problems through engagement
with Israel ultimately may help the Peace Process and
the Palestinians. The factors that unite the United States
and Qatar therefore seem fundamental, and the issues
dividing them seem weak. The military value each
side has to the other is enormous. Differences over al
Jazeera can continue to be discussed usefully but must
not be allowed to poison the relationship.
5. The leadership of the United States must make
a strong effort to understand how its actions may be
placed into the context of Middle Eastern history.
The nations of the Arab World can not be dealt with
effectively without understanding the long history
of interaction between the Arab World and the West,
including periods of substantial Western domination.
This means that our good intentions will not always be
taken for granted, and any sign of Western hypocrisy
will be identified rapidly. The United States must take
differences between itself and the Arab World over
policy as serious matters for discussion. It must not
view policy differences as emerging as a result of a
failure of public relations. The United States needs to
remain aware that Gulf politics cannot be isolated from
the politics of the larger Arab World and Middle East.
6. To the extent that both parties desire it, the
United States needs to strengthen its military and
counterterrorism relations with friendly Arab
governments. Terrorism will become either an
increasing or decreasing problem, depending on a
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variety of factors including what might happen in Iraq,
and every effort must be made to defeat the terrorists.
However flawed our current allies are, they are hugely
better than terrorists such as Kuwait’s Peninsula Lions
or al Qa’ida of the Arabian Peninsula. Everything
possible to help them in their struggles is worth
consideration, and we must do nothing that impedes
their efforts or suggests that we may be equivocating
in our support for them in the face of enemies such as
those noted above.
7. The United States, and especially the U.S.
military, needs to reduce and remove bureaucratic
obstacles to bringing allied Arab officers to the United
States to receive military training and education.
This is particularly the case with officers from highly
strategic countries and countries that can fund the
overseas education and training of their nationals.
Anything that can be done to reduce the difficulty of
Gulf officers coming to the United States for education
and training is well worth consideration.
8. The United States must recognize that small
Gulf powers have good reasons to seek U.S. bases
on their soil, but these states will also be reluctant
to antagonize regional powers such as Iran. While
small, weak, and rich countries will never want to be
left to the tender mercies of their larger Gulf neighbors,
neither do they wish to antagonize them unnecessarily.
Refusal to confront powerful neighbors in an open
and public way is second nature to small and weak
states and should not be viewed as a sign of waning
commitment to a defense relationship with the United
States. Rather, it is an effort not to insult a highly
sensitive and dangerous neighbor. However pleasant
such niceties appear, the leaderships of the Gulf Arab
states do not trust Iran.
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9. The United States needs to avoid mistreating
its allies needlessly as occurred as a result of the
cancellation of the Dubai Ports World agreement
with the United Arab Emirates. A staggering amount
of utterly inaccurate information was put forth
during this controversy to a public that was almost
completely unaware of the existence of the UAE, let
alone the value of its friendship to the United States.
White House efforts to address public concerns and
explain the relationship were useful but ultimately
were unsuccessful due to widespread lack of public
understanding about both the value of the relationship
with the UAE and the nonthreatening nature of the
agreement with Dubai Ports World. Good allies must
not be treated as expendable, since the United States
might need their help at some future point. Continuing
efforts to educate the public on these matters remain
important. The efforts and courage of the U.S.
administration in this matter should be lauded by those
experts who understand this situation, even if they do
not agree with the administration on other matters.
10. The United States should continue to work
with the Bahraini government to ensure a continued
U.S. presence in that country. The United States
also should continue to encourage ongoing Bahraini
efforts at reform and a government that is inclusive
of Shi’ites. Should serious sectarian violence continue
to escalate in Iraq, it might strongly affect the political
situation in Bahrain. Yet, any U.S. withdrawal from
Bahrain at a time of limited and containable civil unrest
could be interpreted as a lack of confidence in the
monarchy’s ability to survive. U.S. friendship therefore
could be viewed as fickle and only as valuable as the
umbrella that works perfectly, except when it rains.
Force protection analysts therefore must find creative
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ways to protect U.S. service personnel in Bahrain,
using approaches that do not undercut our allies, if
this is possible. A full civil war in Bahrain, of course,
would be a different situation, but one hopes that the
Bahrainis would be wise enough to pull back from this
alternative.
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